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Preface 
In recent decades farm programs designed to 
enhance and stabilize farm incomes have been 
based, in large measure, on a system of price sup-
ports and acreage reduction. It has been assumed 
that acreage reduction would limit output and, 
therefore, make price supports effective. However, 
land is only one of many inputs. If the land input 
is reduced but other inputs are increased, it is pos-
sible, within certain limits at least, to maintain or 
even increase output and defeat the original pur-
pose of restricting acreage. A common example is 
the reduction of acreage but applying more ferti-
lizer on the remaining acreage. 
This study takes a look at the problem of con-
trolling production by controlling inputs in agri-
culture. It examines, not only possible methods of 
controlling major inputs but also the potential im-
pacts of input controls on production and on the 
economy. Some of the problems that would be in-
volved in administering such controls are also ex-
plored. 
The report brings to light some concepts and 
problems that deserve discussion and consideration 
by those concerned with agricultural policy. 
C. Peairs Wilson, 
Administrative Advisor 
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Summary 
Agricultural supply is believed co be excessive in 
relation to demand, as a result of excessive inputs of pro-
ductive facrors in agriculture. This report appraises al-
ternative methods of controlling agricultural supply by 
controlling inputs. 
Total agricultural production in the United States 
has been increasing rapidly over the past 20 years, but 
the total of the inputs in agriculture has been increasing 
only slightly. The composition of the inputs , however, has 
been changing markedly. The input of labor, which used 
to be the largest item, has been declining rapidly-from 
nearly two-thirds of the total in 1870, and more than half 
in 1940, to only 30 percent in 1958. The input of capital 
rose, offsetting the decline in labor, from 17 percent in 
1870 to 54 percent in 195 7. 
Thus, measured in dollar-value terms, land is the 
least important input in agriculture and capital is rapid-
ly being substituted for labor in agriculture, Now the in-
put of capital is greater in value than the input of the 
two other factors combined. 
Inputs can be controlled in two ways : 
1. General. Control of the prices of outputs, which 
control the inducement to commit inputs to agricultural 
production, or control of credit for the purchase of in-
puts. 
2 . Specific. Control of specific inputs-land, labor, or 
capital-by specific methods. 
These two classes of methods are appraised below: 
1. General methods. 
a. The traditional method for controlling inputs in 
agriculture is to let it be done automatically by prices in 
the open market. Some groups-even some commodity 
groups-recommend that agricultural prices be returned 
to the open market now. 
This would reduce the cost and administrative prob-
lems of government production-control programs, and 
exert pressure toward efficient production; bur the law of 
supply and demand works so slowly in agriculture, be-
cause of the low mobility of agricultural inputs, char 
agricultural prices would fall below long-run equilibrium 
levels for a number of years . This would cause severe 
hardships to many farmers . 
b. A less drastic method is a two-price system, car-
ried back to individual producers, under which each pro-
ducer receives a relatively high basic price for his basic 
quantity, bur a lower open-market price for production 
in excess of the basic quantity. 
This would be only a temporary stop-gap to alleviate 
the symptoms. It would not correct the underlying dis-
ease of excessive inputs in agriculture. 
c. If credit for the purchase of inputs were con-
trolled, that would control the inputs. But restriction of 
credit would increase costs and conflict with govern-
mental policy to amplify the supply of credit ro farmers. 
It would in any case be difficult to institute for the bulk 
of the credit which is handled by private banks. 
d. A continuous stream of irrigation and other forms 
of land reclamation projects continues to pour forth from 
one hand of government, increasing agricultural produc-
tion, at the same time that the other hand is trying 
desperately to reduce agricultural production. 
In 1959, the Bureau of Reclamation system of ir-
rigation projects included nearly seven million acres of 
irrigated land, which produced a gross crop value of more 
than $1.1 billion. This value of $1.1 billion is more than 
5 percent of the total value of all crops produced in the 
United States ($19.6 billion in 1960). This percentage is 
almost as great as the estimated annual surplus produc-
tion in recent years (6 to 8 percent). And $1.1 billion is 
a little more than the estimated reduction in agricul-
tural production that was achieved by the Conservation 
Reserve program at its peak in 1960. 
In addition, ACP subsidies amount to more than 
$200 million annually. Most of these increase agricultural 
production in the long run. 
A reduction of these BLR and ACP subsidies would 
reduce agricultural production to some extent. There 
would be, however, some political and economic objec-
tions to this. 
2. Specific methods. 
a. Land. The quantity of rhe input land can be con-
trolled by two different methods : 
1. By controlling the acreages of specific crops, as 
under the acreage control programs initiated in the 1930's 
and exemplified recently in the emergency feed grains 
programs and wheat programs of 1961 and Iacer years. 
2. By controlling cropland regardless of crop, as un-
der the Conservation Reserve part of the Soil Bank pro-
gram initiated in 1956. 
The rental rates under the Conservation Reserve pro-
gram varied directly but less than proportionately with 
the profitability (net revenue producing ability) of the 
land. The program paid relatively more for poor land, 
and more poor land chan good land went into the pro-
gram. This, plus the provision that whole farms could 
be put into the program (and 70 percent of the land in 
rhe program consisted of whole farms) caused participa-
tion to be concentrated in poor soil areas . This had ad-
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the program consisted of whole farms) caused participa-
tion to be concentrated in poor soil areas. This had ad-
verse effects on some communities in these areas, but it 
was in line with long-run goals of productive efficiency. 
In contrast, the rental rates for the 1961 and later 
emergency feed grains and wheat programs were set 
more nearly proportionate with profitability, so that 
good, medium, and poor land alike went into the pro-
gram. In addition, 40 percent of a farm's cropland was 
the maximum that could be put into the program. Par-
ticipation, therefore, was less concentrated and had less 
adverse effects on communities, but more adverse effects 
on the efficiency of production. The program was larger 
and had more effect in reducing production than the 
Conservation Reserve program. 
Land rent o~ poor soil tends to be a smaller per-
centage of the total value of the crop produced on the 
land than land rent on good soil. Accordingly, there are 
logical grounds for believing that programs of the Con-
servation Reserve type, which take out chiefly poor land, 
reduce production at less cost per dollar of program cost 
than programs like the food grains and wheat programs, 
which take out good, medium and poor land alike. This 
hypothesis is confirmed to some extent by available em-
pirical data; the USDA estimates that production reduc-
tion per dollar of program cost for the 1960 Conserva-
tion Reserve program was $2.80. Our estimate for the 
feed grains program, $1.20, is less than half as high as 
this. The assumptions underlying our estimates for the 
feed grains programs differed to some extent from those 
used by the USDA for their estimates for the Conserva-
tion Reserve program, and there were differences in the 
programs themselves, which also affected the estimates; 
but the estimates indicate that the initial cost to the gov-
ernment per unit of production reduced was substantial-
ly less for the Conservation Reserve program than for 
the feed grains program. 
The eventual costs, including a credit for the storage 
costs avoided, are difficult to compare, since the produc-
tion of many other crops besides feed grains was reduced 
-some of which would not be stored. 
At the same time programs such as the Conserva-
tion Reserve, which remove the poorer land and take out 
whole farms, promote more transfer of labor and capital 
out of agriculture per dollar of government payments 
than do the feed grains and wheat programs. This is in 
line with long-run goals of more efficient resource use. 
b. Capital. Capital has grown to be the most im-
portant input in agriculture. 
The use of fertilizer, for example, increased greatly 
during the 1950's. It is estimated that if 30 percent less 
fertilizer had been used, that would have reduced agri-
cultural production about 8 percent, enough to have 
eliminated excessive production. Fertilizer use is respon-
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sive to price; if its price were raised substantially, less 
would be used. One of the simplest ways to raise the 
'price of fertilizer would be to put a stiff tax on it. Fer-
tilizer companies and farmers undoubtedly would object 
to this. 
Diesel fuel and gasoline are exempt from the regular 
fuel tax when used in farm tractors. A program to re-
duce this input could be implemented by removing this 
tax exemption. The demand for tractor fuel is so inelas-
tic, however, that the chief effect of doing this would be 
to raise farmers' ire rather than to reduce production. 
The political pressure against such reductions of 
capital inputs as these would be fortified by economic 
arguments that this reduction would reduce efficiency, 
and thus, tend to reduce income per farmer. This ten-
dency might be strong enough to offset the effects of 
higher prices for farm products if the program succeeded 
in reducing production. The same sort of thing is true, 
only less obviously, of reductions in the input of land. 
Current programs to reduce production do not, in 
fact, control agricultural supply (the position of the sup-
ply curve); they deal only with production (a point on 
the supply curve) leaving the position of the supply curve 
unaffected. The over-production problem is only pushed 
back, not solved. The program works against itself; the 
more it pushes production back and raises prices, so that 
production becomes profitable, the more it has to pay 
farmers not to produce. 
Production control programs do not get at the basic 
long-run farm problem. The current short-run problem is 
an excessive supply of farm products, but the basic long-
run problem is an excessive supply of farm labor and 
management. 
c. Labor and management. The basic long-run prob-
lem shows up in the form of low income per farmer rela-
tive to incomes in other occupations. The birth rate in 
agriculture is higher than the rate required to maintain 
a constant farm population, yet the demand for farmers 
has been decreasing rapidly as the average size and pro-
ductivity of farms increases. Today the farm population 
in the United States is only half as great as it was in 
1940. It is only 8 percent of the total population. 
The supply of cropland was reduced by the Con-
servation Reserve, feed grains, wheat and other programs 
in recent years, and this had some reducing effect on crop 
production. The initial effect of this was to increase gross 
farm income. But the distribution of this increase in 
farm income among the factors of production, land, labor 
and capital, was determined by what had been done to 
decrease the supply of each one. And since only the 
supply of land had been reduced, and nothing had been 
done to reduce the supply of the other factors, labor and 
capital, economic theory would lead one to expect that 
l.
. 
. 
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most of the increase in income in the long run, would 
go to land, and little or none to labor and capital. 
The empirical data support this hypothesis. Other 
things were happening along with the programs, of 
course, to affect farm incomes. But official USDA data 
show that the United States average per acre value of 
farm land and buildings ros~ 78 percent from 1947-49 to 
1961, while per capita farm income rose only 40 percent, 
and net income per farm rose only 24 percent. Another 
USDA set of data, compiled by type of farming areas, 
shows an actual decline in returns to farm operator and 
family labor since 1947-49. 
The basic solution to the fundamental farm problem, 
then, is to reduce the continuing excess of farmers which 
continually depresses farm incomes. 
This does not call for a program to "move farmers 
off farms." It calls for a program to help those farmers 
who want to move off farms themselves, but who need 
help to overcome the serious obstacles that impede their 
movement. 
In the past, the reduction in farm population came 
about not so much by established farmers moving out 
of farming, as by young farm boys and girls-potential 
farmers-refraining from going into farming. They choose 
5 
other occupations instead of going into farming. This is 
much easier than going into farming and then trying to 
get out. For the future, then, the chief emphasis needs 
to be put on programs to reduce the inflow of potential 
young farmers into farming, more than on helping estab-
lished farmers to move out. If farm boys and girls who 
will not be needed in agriculture are informed about job 
opportunities in other occupations and given education 
and training for those other jobs, they will move into 
them relatively easily. This plus adjustments in farm size 
by those remaining on farms will reduce the excessive 
number of farmers and reduce the disparity between farm 
and nonfarm incomes. 
The problem is more than an agricultural problem. 
It is part of the stubborn national problem of under- and 
un-employment, which persists at about 6 percent in spite 
of strenuous efforts to reduce it. Underemployment is a 
severe problem in a number of other industries-coal 
mining, for example-as well as in agriculture. It exists 
to some extent in a number of other industries, chiefly 
among the workers with the least training. The more 
completely the unemployment problem is solved in other 
industries, the easier it will be to solve the problem in 
agriculture. 
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e Much has been written concerning the farm prob-
lem in the United States in recent years. Diverse opin-
ions are expressed about the kind of programs that are 
needed to cope with the problem; diverse opinions are 
expressed even about what the problem is in the first 
place. 
Some observers believe that the farm problem is a 
price problem; they refer to it as "the cost-price squeeze". 
This is actually a "prices-received prices-paid" squeeze; 
it is shown in figure 1. This price problem, they say-
low prices received by farmers, compared with the prices 
farmers pay-is caused by United States agricultural pro-
duction increasing faster than United States population; 
this conclusion is based on the farm output and popula-
tion data shown in figure 2.1 Two years of emergency 
feed grain and wheat programs were required, in 1961 
and 1962, to bring production down more nearly in line 
with population, and actually below utilization. 
The USDA attributes the rapid increase in produc-
tion to the widespread adoption of new production tech-
nology. 2 But a recent statistical analysis indicates that 
only half of the excess of production resulted from tech-
nology; the rest was due to a five-year run of good crop 
weather, from 1958 to 1962. The analysis indicates fur-
ther that if the weather had been average, there would 
have been no surplus corn produced. '1 In this view, the 
farm problem is chiefly a good-weather problem. 
With the weather as it was, however, production 
controls were used for 1961-1962. They are now in use 
for 1963, and they probably will be used again in later 
years. Agricultural production can be controlled by sev-
eral different methods. Accordingly, this report is focused 
upon the specific question: If controls of agricultural 
production continues to be deemed necessary by Con-
gress, what would be the consequences of using several 
different possible programs to attain it? 
Programs to control agricultural production fall into 
two groups: (1) Those which seek to control production 
by controlling agricultural output (by marketing quotas, 
etc.) and those which seek to control production by con-
1 Earlier versions of this chart looked more alarming than 
the present chart. They showed a greater excess of the pro-
duction index over the population index; the production in-
dex for 1957 was the same figure as the population index, 
and for 1958, 1959 and 1960, ran about eight points higher 
than the population index. Later revisions brought these in-
dexes down several points, showing that the problem actual-
ly was not as bad as it looked in 1961. 
2 0rville L. Freeman, "Statement" in "Food and Agri-
culture: A Program for the 1960's". U. S. Dept. of Agricul-
ture, Washington 25, D. C., March 1962. P. V. 
3 Louis M. Thompson, "How weather has affected our 
feed grain surplus," Better Farming Methods. September 1962. 
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trolling inputs in agriculture (of land, labor , etc.). This 
report is limited to the second of these methods-con-
trolling agricultural production by controlling inputs in 
agriculture. ·I 
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF 
INPUTS IN AGRICULTURE 
TABLE I-CHANGES ill COMPOSITION OF INPUTS, 
UNITED STATES AGRICULTURE, 1870-1957 
Year 
1870 
1 880 
1890 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1940 
1950 
1957 
In12uts Based on 1 935- 39 Price Weights 
Percentage of total imputsa 
Real 
CaJ2italb Labor estate 
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) 
65 18 17 
62 19 19 
60 18 22 
57 19 24 
53 20 27 
50 18 32 
46 18 36 
41 18 41 
Inputs Based on 1947-49 Price Weights 
56 
40 
31 
14 
15 
15 
30 
45 
54 
Total 
(Percent) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
aThe use of different price weights prohibits direct com-
parison of composition percentages for the periods before 
and after 1940. However, changes in composition within 
the two price-weight periods , 1870-1940 and 1940-47, 
serve to indicate the magnitude of changes in composition 
or input. Comparisons of periods before and after 1940 
substantiate the trend in changes of input mix. 
bAll inputs other than labor and real estate. 
Source: Productivity of Agriculture Technical Bulletin 
No. 1238 United States, 1870-1958, 1961, p. 11. 
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Total agricultural production in the United States 
has been increasing rapidly over the past 20 years, but 
r he f(Ha I of the inputs in agriculture has been increasing 
unly sligh tly . The composition of the inputs, however, 
has been changing markedly. Table 1 shows these changes 
in percentage form by decades since 1870.5 Figure 3 
shows the changes in terms of dollars annually from 1940 
to 1960.6 
It is apparent that the input of labor, which used to 
be the largest item, has been declining rapid] y -from 
nearly two-thirds of the total in 1870, and more than 
half in 1940, to only 30 percent in 1958. 
The input of capital rose, offsetting the decline in 
labor, from 17 percent in 1870 to 54 percent in 1957. 
The most important facts shown by this table and 
chart are (1) that measured in dollar value terms, land 
' Investigation of the first method was assigned by the 
Inter-regional Research Committee on Research in Agricul-
tural Policy to Minnesota ; the second was assigned to Iowa. 
The results of the Minnesota study were published by L. P. 
Schertz and E. W. Learn in, "Administrative Controls on 
Quantities Marketed in the Feed-Livestock Economy," Tech-
nical Bulletin 241, University of Minnesota Agricultural Ex-
periment Station. December 1962. 
5 Ralph A. Loomis and Glen T. Barron, "Productivity of 
Agriculture, United States, 1870-1958," Technical Bulletin 
No. 1238, April 1961. 
"Ibid. 
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is the smallest input in agriculture, and (2) that capital 
is rapidly being substituted for labor in agriculture, until 
now the input of capital is greater in value than the in-
put of the two other factors combined. 
8 
TWO CLASSES OF METHODS 
Broadly speaking, there are two different classes of 
methods for controlling inputs in agriculture. 
General. 
a. The methods in this class control inputs by con-
trolling the prices of the outputs. This affects the profits 
which constitute the inducement to commit inputs to 
the industry. The open marker is one method in this 
class; milk price plans are another. 
b. A different kind of method in this general class 
exercises control of inputs by control of credit for the 
purchase of inputs. 
Specific. 
The methods in this class attempt to control spe-
cific inputs-land, labor, or capital-by specific methods, 
different for each kind of input. 
We will describe and appraise different methods un-
der these two broad classes in order below, beginning 
with the general class and then proceeding to the spe-
cific class. 
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Part 1 
General Methods of Controlling Inputs 
CONTROL OF INPUTS BY 
PRICES IN THE OPEN 
MARKET 
The traditional method of controlling inputs in any 
atomistically-competitive industry like agriculture is to 
let it be done by prices in the open market. This is one 
of the methods that is being advocated by some groups 
now-to abandon government farm programs and re-
turn agriculture to the open market. 7 
The general argument for returning agriculture to 
the open market runs like this: The amount of produc-
tive resources committed to agriculture is excessive. In a 
free market, the excessive production resulting from this 
excess of productive resources would drive the returns to 
those resources below the levels they would attain in 
other occupations. So the remedy is to stop supporting 
prices and return agriculture to the open market. Prices 
and returns then would fall. The low returns then would 
drive the excess resources out of agriculture until there-
sources would cease to be excessive and their returns 
would rise to competitive levels-the same levels as they 
would attain ifl other occupations. 
to competitive levels-the same levels as they would at-
tain in other occupations. 
This general argument may appear merely academic, 
doctrinaire, and impractical to some, and hard-nosed com-
monsense to others. But several commodity producer 
groups support it by urgent practical arguments for re-
turning their crops to or toward the open market. 
Cotton in the United States, for example, is described 
by competent cotton authorities as being "now in the 
worst competitive position, by far, that it has ever held"8 
because of a change in United States price policy in 1960 
7
"An Adaptive Program for Agriculture" A Statement 
on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee 
of the Committee for Economic Development. 711 Fifth 
Avenue, New York 22, New York, 1962. 
See also L. H. Simer!, "Do We Really Need Price Sup-
ports?", Better Farming Methods, November 1962, pp. 8-10. 
8 M. K. Horne, Jr. and Frank A. McCord, "Price and 
Today 's Markets for U. S. Cotton," National Cotton Coun-
cil of America, Memphis, Tennessee, September 1962, p. 26. 
9 
which raised cotton prices. At the same time, rayon and 
dacron prices, which up to that time had run closely 
similar to cotton prices, were sharply reduced. These 
price relationships are shown in figure 4. Greater detail 
is shown in figure 5. This figure shows the sharp rise in 
rayon staple consumption and decline in cotton consump-
tion that followed. 
The high domestic prices for cotton also increased 
imports of cotton in manufactured form into the United 
States, from a negligible amount in 1952 to an annual 
rate equivalent to about 700,000 bales of cotton in 1962. 
Fig. 4-Domestic Cotton Prices, January, 1955, to 
September, 1962. 
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These imports are manufactured in foreign countries 
from cotton purchased on a world market in which the 
biggest influence is the price of our own cotton , which 
we export at a price 8.5 cents per pound lower than the 
price at which our own mills can buy it. We do chis by 
means of a subsidy. While domestic prices are held at 
present high levels, even the present subsidy of 8.5 cents 
may not be large enough; yet it calls for a quarter of a 
billion dollars a year from the federal treasury if we are 
to export six million bales. 
"There is a theory, which we often hear, that it is 
all right to prop up farm prices to certain preconceived 
high levels, provided the government is permitted to 
hold down production to the volume that will sell at 
those prices. This theory can be pushed too far, and we 
are on the way toward finding an example in cotton. 
"For the catch in this thoery is that there is no mar-
ket volume that we can count upon holding at these 
prices. We will have a certain market next year and the 
next and the next, but it will be disappearing rapidly as 
our competitors eat it up. Eventually this theory of a 
high price and a smaller market will wind up as a high 
price and no market, or a pitifully small one."9 
PROJECTIONS OF PRODUCTION, PRICES AND 
INCOMES UNDER FREE MARKETS 
How far would the prices of farm products fall un-
der if agriculture were returned co the open market, and 
how long would agriculture take to adjust to these prices? 
Two different sets of projections of prices for United 
States Agriculture under free markets were published late 
in 1959. One set was prepared by agricultural economists 
at Iowa State University/ 0 it was confined to the feed-
livestock economy. The other was prepared in the 
USDA. 11 It dealt with the whole of United States Agri-
culture. 
9 M. K. Horne, Jr. and Frank A. McCord, op. cit. , p. 26. 
10Geoffrey Shepherd, Arnold Paulsen, Francis Kutish, 
Donald Kaldor, Richard Heifner, and Eugene Futrell, Pro-
duction, price and income estimates and projections for the feed-
livestock economy under specified control and market-dearing con-
ditions, Special Report No. 27, Iowa State University, Ames, 
Iowa, August 1960. 
"Report from the USDA and a statement by the Land-
Grant Colleges IRM-1 Advisory Committee on Farm Price and 
Im·ome Projections 1960-65 Under Conditions Approximating 
Free Production and Marketing of Agricultural Commodities. 
Presented by Mr. Ellender. January 20, 1960. 
In November 1960, further projections were published 
by John A. Schnittker and Dale E. Hathaway in Economic 
Policies for Agriculture in the 1960's. 86th Congress 2d Session, 
Joint Committee Prine. pp. 21-32 and pp. 33-47. 
10 
The Iowa State University projections were made on 
the assumption that price supports for feed grains and 
wheat would be reduced to the point where no further 
additions to stocks would be made, and export subsidies 
would be eliminated, but sales for foreign currency or 
barter would be continued. The market thus would not 
be completely free. 
The USDA study , made at the request of Senator 
Ellender, assumed that the stocks would be reduced to 
normal over a period of several years. 
In general, the prices projected by the USDA were 
higher than those projected by Iowa State University. 
But both of them were so low that they thoroughly 
alarmed farmers and farm leaders. Hogs, $11.00 per 100 
pounds; beef cattle, $15.00; corn, 80 cents per bushel, or 
less ; wheat, 90 cents per bushel, or less-these projec-
tions indicated concretely what a return to the open 
market would do to the prices of farm products. 
The Iowa economists estimated that if the storage 
programs had not been in effect during the 1950's, aver-
age annual cash receipts would have been about $3.6 bil-
lion lower-about 33 percent lower. The lowering of 
net income would have been less than the lowering of 
total cash receipts in dollars , but it would have been 
greater in percentage terms. 
These estimates indicate chat the storage programs 
raised total cash receipts about 11 percent, and net in-
come about 33 percent. These are substantial percentages, 
especially the gain in net income. 
WOULD THE LAW OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
Some observers believe that the projected low open-
market prices and incomes would shortly reduce produc-
tion in agriculture. This reduction would be great enough 
co bring prices up again to levels high enough to bring 
returns to resources in agriculture up to comparable levels 
with returns in other occupations. That is, these observers 
believe that "the law of supply and demand would take care 
of the farmer." 
Is this true? 
The law of supply and demand in the open market 
is a valid economic concept, but it requires two conditions 
besides large numbers of producers in order to work as 
smoothly and quickly to bring about equality of returns 
as it does in the minds of many who have a knowledge 
of elementary economics. These two conditions are: (1) 
Perfect knowledge of opportunities in different occupa-
tions, and (2) Perfect mobility of the factors of produc-
tion. Economic textbooks spell out these conditions, but 
often they are forgotten in application. And whenever 
these two conditions are not met, the law of supply and 
demand in the open market exerts severe economic pres-
c
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sure upon many farmers who cannot respond by giving 
up their occupation, particularly if they are middle-aged 
or older. 
These two conditions-perfect knowledge, and per-
fect mobility-are not met at all closely in agriculture. 
Imperfect Knowledge. Farmers do not have full and 
accurate knowledge of alternative nonfarm employment 
opportunities. They hear that urban wages are high, but 
they also hear that the costs of urban living are high too, 
and so is unemployment at times; and in most cases they 
do not have specific information such as that the X com-
pany in Y city will take them on next month at Z wages. 
Imperfect Mobility. In addition, the mobility of farm-
ers is low. The law of supply and demand says that when 
prices decline, factors of production (land, labor and 
capital) move out of production, and production declines 
until that decline brings prices up to remunerative levels 
again. But labor and management (farmers) find it dif.. 
ficult to move out of agriculture because of the obstacles 
to free mobility that stand in the way. 
Middle-aged and older farmers, particularly, find it 
difficult to pull up stakes and get a good job in · town. 
They are not trained for city work, and in any case urban 
employers discriminate against men over 40. Young 
farmers can move more easily, but the psychological, 
sociological and economic obstacles are still high. Even 
reducing die flow of potential young farmers into agri-
culture is not easy. Farm boys in high school are likely 
to be taking classes in vocational agriculture rather than 
in vocational industry or commerce. The psychic as well 
as economic obstacles are hard to surmount. 
Above these obtacles lies the further difficulty that 
a speeding up of migration out of agriculture would not 
MULTIPLE PRICE PROGRAMS 
Under the open market, and also under rp.ost price-
support programs , producers all get the same price, ex-
cept for differentials in time, place and form. 
More complex multiple price programs are in use in 
many milk price areas, by which the different prices re-
ceived for the different classifications of milk (uses to 
which the milk is put, such as fresh fluid milk, manu-
facturing milk, etc.) are carried all the way back to the 
1 2These milk price plans are described and analyzed in 
E. S. Harris, Classified Pricing of Milk, USDA Tech. Bul. No. 
1184, 1958, and in G. Shepherd, Marketing Farm Products-
Economic Analyses. Iowa State University Press, 1962, Ch. 24. 
11 
reduce agricultural production proportionately. A small 
speed-up might not reduce production at all. The remain-
ing farmers in many cases would combine the farms into 
larger and more efficient units, so that total agricultural 
production might actually increase rather than decrease. 
Only if the speed-up were substantial enough to induce 
transformation of farmers into more extensive types of 
farming would it have much reducing effect on produc-
tion. And this process is painful and slow. 
If agriculture were returned to the open market, 
then, returns in agriculture would decline from their 
present supported levels, not just to long-run competi-
tive levels (equal to returns in other occupations) but 
below those levels. The distance below would be a func-
tion of the size of the obstacles to mobility, measured in 
dollar terms. And this situation would not bring its own 
cure in a year or two if things were left to themselves. 
This means then that returning agriculture to the 
open market would not solve agriculture's and society's 
problem, until the conditions which could render the 
open market in agriculture effective are established. 
To many observers, this means that, to put it in 
positive terms, steps need to be taken to increase farm 
income by various methods, (1) two-price systems, (2) 
production control by controlling inputs or outputs, or 
both, (3) direct payments to farmers, (4) expansion of 
the demand for farm products, etc., or all of these, until 
other longer-run steps to increase the mobility of the 
factors of production in agriculture, particularly labor and 
management, can take effect. 
We will examine these alternatives in the next few 
sections. 
individual producers.12 Multiple price programs of this 
nature are being proposed for other commodities. 
A form of multiple-price system has, in fact, been in 
effect with a number of export crops since World War 
II. Exports of wheat and cotton, for example, have been 
subsidized by substantial amounts, which vary from year 
to year, and from program to program, sufficient to move 
the commodities into export channels at prices much 
below domestic prices. The different prices in effect for 
wheat in 1956-57 are estimated in table 2. " ... during 
1953-57, virtually all American wheat was exported under 
some type of subsidy or concession associated with of-
ficial efforts to keep domestic wheat prices at artifically 
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TABLE 2-INDICATED MULTIPLE PRICES OF REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN WHEATS, 1956-57 
AVERAGES AND APPROXIMATIONS 
(Dollars per bushel) 
Form of price 
Terminal loan rate 
Domestic market price 
International Wheat 
Agreement export price 
Barter basis 
Foreign currency net price: 
Sec. 402, Mutual Security 
Public Law 480, title I 
No. 2 Hard 
Winter 
(Kansas City) 
2.30 
2.28 
1. 56 
1.25 
64-1.06 
55-0.91 
No. 2 Soft 
Red Winter 
(St. Louis) 
2.30 
2.23 
1. 50 
1. 20 
61-1. 02 
55-0. 92 
No. 1 dk. 
Northern 
Spring 
(Minneapolis) 
2.34 
2 . 31 
1.45 
1.16 
60-1.00 
60-0.99 
No. 1 Soft 
White 
(Portland) 
2.21 
2.41 
1. 50 
1. 27 
65-1. 08 
63-1. 05 
Source: Helen Farnsworth, "Wheat Under Multiple Pricing: A Case Study," Policy for Commercial Agriculture, Nov. 22, 
1957. Footnotes to the table omitted. 
high levels in the face of record heavy wheat stocks."13 
In this case, the different prices were not carried back 
to individual producers. All producers received the same 
price (the higher of the two or more prices). The gov-
ernment made up the loss resulting from sale at low 
prices abroad. 
The treasury costs for this program for wheat are 
high. They run at about half a billion dollars a year. 
MILK PRICE PLANS 
Two-price or multiple-price systems have been in ef-
fect for a good many years with milk. Fluid milk prices 
in the Middle West usually run about 40 cents per 100 
pounds above the price of surplus milk which is diverted 
to man ufacruring purposes. 14 
Two-price systems for milk were developed because 
fluid milk producers believed that the prices they re-
ceived were being beat down by the milk dealers, who 
were usually large in size and small in numbers in each 
milkshed and thus were in a oligopsonistic position. The 
producers formed themselves into "bargaining associa-
tions" which were designed to meet the oligopsonistic 
power of the dealers with monopoly power of their own, 
13 Helen Farnsworth, "Wheat Under Multiple Pi-icing: 
A Case Study," Policy for Commercial Agriculture-Its Relation 
to Economic Growth and Stability. Joint Economic Committee, 
November 22, 1957, p. 563. 
14Milk dealers in the Chicago area in March 1960, for 
example, paid farmers $3.39 per 100 pounds for milk for 
fluid purposes, but only $2 .99 for milk for manufacturing 
purposes, our of the same cow. (Supplement for 1961 to 
Federal Milk Order Market Statistics. Stat. Bul. No. 248, 
USDA, Nov. 1962. pp. 88, 89.) 
12 
and enable them to take advantage of the differing elas-
ticities of demand for fluid milk and manufacturing milk. 
But milk is irregular in flow and highly perishable, so 
instead of bargaining to set the price from day to day, 
the two groups meet only at infrequent intervals to work 
out a formula which would set prices from month to 
month automatically in response to changing supply and 
demand. 
Multiple price systems are also used for some spe-
cialized fruits and nuts, as in California. They have not 
previously been used with such nationally-produced pro-
ducts as cotton or wheat, except in the form of export 
subsidies, as shown above. What is new in present pro-
posals is the plan tO use two prices for domestic sale, car-
ried back to the individual producer. 
TWO-PRICE PLAN FOR WHEAT 
A formal two-price program for wheat was incor-
porated in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962. 
The level of price support (the commodity loan 
rate) for wheat of the 1963 crop is $2 per bushel for par-
ticipating producers (those who agree to divert part of 
their wheat acreage, in accordance with the provisions of 
the program) . The rate to "cooperators who are not par-
ticipating producers" is $1.82 per bushel. The 18 cents 
difference between these two rates will be represented by 
negotiable certificates, prorated according to each pro-
ducer's wheat acreage allotment. 15 
One of the results of supporting prices above open-
15Report No. 2385, House of Representatives, 87th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, September 17, 1962, Food and Agricul-
ture Act of 1962, Conference Report, p. 11. 
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market levels is that this leads farmers to increase pro-
duction. A two-price system where the two prices are 
carried back to the individual producer can avoid this 
effect. In the two-price plan for wheat in the Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1962, the lower price for each pro-
ducer's production above his (high-price) quota is in-
tended to be low enough so as not to induce an increase 
in production. 
This situation is shown in simplified form in figure 
6. The high price for the quota quantity would cut the 
supply curve above the intersection point with the de-
mand curve, bur the high price applies only to the rela-
tively small quota quantity. The quantity produced in ex-
cess of the quota receives only the lower price. In prin-
ciple, each farmer carries his total production out to the 
point where his marginal costs equal the marginal (non-
quota) price. Yet he still is able tO get the high price for 
bis quota quantity. 
Fig. 6-A Two-Price System Reduces the Incentive to 
Increase Production. 
$ 
t 
QUOTA 
This indicates that a two-price system may be a 
means for escaping the present dilemna in agriculture: 
(1) If prices continue to be supported at high levels, 
that provides an incentive for farmers to over-produce; 
this involves the government in expensive and dead-end 
storage programs to withhold the excessive production 
from the market, or adds to the expense of paying farm-
ers not to produce the excess. (2) If price supports are 
lowered, that reduces farm incomes. 
A two-price system which kept price supports high 
for say two-thirds of each farmer's previous production 
would maintain his income on that two-thirds, while the 
lower price for the rest of his crop would remove the in-
centive to increase production . This wou ld p:1rri:1llr re-
solve the present dilemma. 
Two-price systems, however, can at best be consider-
ed only a temporary stop-gap. There are several reasons 
for this: 
1. The quota quantities would have a tendency to 
freeze production patterns, in a world where continuously 
changing technology requires continuously changing pro-
duction patterns. 
2. They would be regarded by other countries as 
subsidizing production in the United States, and those 
other countries would believe themselves justified in put-
ting countervailing duties on our exports to them. 
3. In addition, two-price systems would help to al-
leviate the low farm incomes without encouraging an ad-
justment to the underlying causes of the low-income 
farmers' situation. A two-price program would not pay 
these farmers to move off the farm; it would pay them 
to stay. Many of these farmers would be those who prize 
the non-monetary values of farm life highly enough to 
offset the lower money incomes they would receive on 
the farm. If their money incomes fell lower than 20 per-
cent below the income they could earn in town, many of 
them would move to jobs in town. But if income pay-
ments make up part or all of the gap, they would stay 
on the farm. Their symptoms, low incomes, would be re-
lieved, but the causes of their low incomes would persist, 
unchanged. The problem would only be covered up; it 
would not be solved. 
For these reasons, two-price systems are only tem-
porarily effective unless they include a clear understand-
ing, spelled out in the legislation, that the higher of the 
two prices would steadily be reduced over the next few 
years to the same level as the lower price. This would 
give farmers time to plan readjustments. 
CONTROL OF CREDIT 
Another general method of controlling inputs in 
agriculture is to do it by controlling the credit which 
gives command over inputs of capital, land, and labor. 
The control of agricultural credit would reduce many 
farmers' power to purchase inputs and commit them to 
agricultural production. 
l3 
The Federal government plays an important role in 
farm credit, beginning during the depression of the 1930's 
when many farmers had difficulty in obtaining enough 
credit. The Farm Credit Administration was created in 
1933, and the Federal government got into the farm 
credit business on a large scale. It is still in it. Table 3 
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TABLE 3-FARM-MORTGAGE LOANS: AMOUNT OUTSTANDING HELD BY PRINCIPAL LENDERS, UNITED STATES, 
JANUARY1, 1944-60.a 
Date in Millions of Dollars 
Federal Commercial 
Federal Farm Joint-stock Farmers Life and Individuals 
land Mortgage land- Home insurance savings and 
Yea r banksb Corporn.tionbc banksbd Administratione companiesf banksg others Total 
1944 1, 452 430 10 174 987 448 1 , 8~J4 5, 39G 
1945 1 , 210 347 5 195 938 450 1 ,785 4, 941 
1946 1,079 239 3 184 891 507 1 , 856 4,780 
1947 977 147 2 192 889 683 2,008 4,897 
1948 889 107 198 960 841 2,069 5,064 
1949 888 78 192 1, 036 901 2,212 5,288 
1950 906 59 193 1,172 937 2, :.n1 5,579 
1951 947 44 220 1,353 1,008 2,546 6,118 
1952 994 33 241 1,541 1 , 046 2,819 6, 676 
1953 1, 071 24 268 1, 716 1,105 :1,079 7, 26;) 
1954 1,169 1 8 282 1,893 1,1 31 3,279 7, 772 
1955 1, 267 13 28 7 2,052 1, 211 3,4G9 t:i,289 
1956 1, 480 278 2, 272 1, 346 :J,690 9,066 
1957 1,722 289 2, 476 1, 386 4, 03:3 9,908 
1958 1, 897 340 2,579 1, 414 4,277 10,507 
1959 2,065 388 2,661 1, 512 4,628 11 , 254 
1960 2,335 437 2, 819 1,625 5,072 12,289 
aExcludes Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and possessions . 
bMortgages in process of foreclosure were estimated for 1951 and 1952. 
CLoans were made on the Corporation's behalf by the Land Bank Commissioner. Loans were limited to refinancing of existing 
Commissioner loans from July 1, 1947 to June 30, 1955 when outstanding loans of the Corporation wer e sold to the 12 Federal 
loan banks. 
dJoint- stock land banks in liquidation which was completed April 26, 1951 . 
eData include tenant- purchase loans; direct soil and water conservation loans to individuals ; farm-development (special real 
estate) loans and farm- enlargement loans beginning 1944; project-liquidation loans beginning 1945; farm-housing loans beginning 
July 1950; and building improvement loans beginning 1955. Data also includes loans for these purposes from State Corporation 
trust funds. 
fEstimates based on direct reports from the insurance companies, official reports submitted to State insurance commissioners, 
"Test's Life Insurance Reports," "Spectator Life Insurance Yearbook," and data from Life Insurance Association of America 
and Institute of Life Insurance includes legal reserve companies only. 
g1944 - 47 insured commercial banks; and 1948 to date, all operating commercial savings, and private banks. Beginning 1956, 
includes soil and water conservation loans insured by the Farmers Home Administration. 
Agricultural Research Service. Data for 1919-43 in Agricultural Statistics, 1961, table 711. 
shows that the Federal Land Banks held more than $2 
billion of farm-mortgage loans in 1961. 
The table also shows the loans held by the Farmers 
Home Administration, and by private lending agencies. 
The latter amount to nearly $10 billion, about four times 
as much as the two government agencies combined. Ac-
cordingly, any unified control of most of the credit ex-
tended to farmers today would have to be exercised by 
private lending agencies, chiefly. 
14 
It is difficult to see how this could be done. One of 
the most feasible ways would be for the banks, etc., to 
raise the interest rate on farm loans. But it is difficult to 
devise a feasible way to induce them to do this. It would 
reduce their loan business, and farmers would regard it 
as unfair discrimination among the bank's borrowers. The 
Farm Credit Administration was created to make credit 
more readily available to farmers; if credit were restricted 
now, farmers would simply turn to the Farm Credit Ad-
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ministration in larger numbers, unless irs rates were raised 
also. This roo would be difficult. 
Other methods of restricting credit-other than rais-
ing interest rates-could also be used. Some of them 
might be more effective and quicker acting, for agricul-
tural interest rates are slow ro move; also, it is believed 
that "the elasticity of the demand for short-run borrow-
ings is low."16 A more direct control is exercised by the 
local banker himself; he is likely to leave the interest rare 
unchanged, but when his clients come in to ask for loans, 
he may simply reduce the "availability" of his funds by 
cutting the amount he will loan ro each borrower, or at 
least to the less desirable borrowers, say 10 or 20 percent. 
This rationing is likely to be quite effective. 17 
The problem of how to induce a large number of 
bankers to restrict credit like this would still remain. 
"Selective controls" on this type of borrowing might be 
imposed by some such legislation as Regulation X under 
the Defense Production Act of 1950, which delegated to 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
some control over real estate credit. It is impossible to 
assess accurately how effective this Regulation X was;18 
it was suspended in 1952. 
In any case, if farm credit were restricted, that would 
bear unevenly on different classes of farmers. Those who 
had their farms all paid for, or who had independent 
means from other sources, would simply continue to 
finance themselves; it would be the young farmers start-
ing in farming, and those with few reserves, who would 
feel the pinch. There would be strong objections from these 
farmers as well as from the credit agencies. 
These objections could be fortified by appeal to con-
siderations of economic efficiency. Reducing the input of 
capital would cause the rate of return to capital to rise. 
Reducing the input of capital would be a misdirection of 
resources from the national point of view. 
General control over agricultural inputs by control 
of agricultural credit, therefore, appears politically dif-
ficult and economically unwise. 
CONTROL OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
LAND RECLAMATION 
A continuous stream of irrigation and other forms 
of land reclamation projects continues to pour forth from 
one hand of government, increasing agricultural produc-
tion, at the same time that the other hand is trying to 
reduce agricultural production. 
The size of the Bureau of Reclamation system of ir-
rigation projects is greater than many people realize. In 
1959, these projects included nearly seven million acres 
of irrigated land, which produced a gross crop value of 
more than $1.1 billion. 19 
This value of $1.1 billion is more than 5 percent of 
the total value of all crops produced in the United States 
($19.6 billion in 1960). 20 This percentage is almost as 
great as the estimated annual surplus production in re-
cent years (6 to 8 percent). 21 And $1.1 billion is a little 
16 Harris, C. Lowell, section entitled "Interest Rate or 
Availability? or Both?" from Money and Banking, Allyn and 
Bacon, Inc., Boston 1961, p. 439. 
17 Ibid., p. 440. 
18Steiner, Shapiro, Solomon, "Real Estate Credit Con-
trol" from Money and Banking, fourth edition. Henry Holt 
and Company, New York, October, 1958. p. 330. See also 
"Selective Controls" from Money and Credit, The Report of the 
Commission on Money and Credit, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersery, 1961. pp. 71-76. 
19Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, p. 607. 
Data for 1961 are given, by states, in Agricultural Conserva-
15 
more than the estimated reduction in agricultural pro-
duction that was achieved by the Conservation Reserve 
program at its peak in 1960.22 
The Bureau of Reclamation also handles extensive 
farm drainage projects. The farm drainage data are put 
up differently from the irrigation data; no estimates of 
gross crop value are made for the areas drained. The cost 
of these drainage operations from 1950 to 1959 totaled 
$186 million. 23 
Reclamation projects are defended because they add 
to the productivity of the nation. But in so doing, they 
create surpluses which lead to programs to reduce pro-
duction in the established agricultural areas, at a cost of 
billions of dollars. Taxpayers pay twice-once, to finance 
the reclamation projects to increase production, and 
tion Program, Summary by States, 1961, USDA, 1962. 
20 Agricultural Statistics, 1961, p. 451. 
21 USDA, Food and Agriculture, A Program for the 
1960's, March 1962, p. v. 
22
"Total value of normal crop production at prevailing 
farm prices on all land in the (Conservation Reserve) pro-
gram was equivalent to 4.5 percent of the total value of all 
crops produced in 1960. (R. P. Christensen and R. 0. Aines, 
"Economic Effects of Acreage Control Programs in the 
1950's," Ag. Ec. Rpt. No. 18, ERS, USDA, 1962, p. 26). 
23Statistical Abstract of the United States, USDA, 1961, 
p. 607. 
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again, to finance the production-control programs to re-
duce production. It may be impart~al to subsidize both 
teams in a football game, but it would be a lot more 
efficient and less costly to finance only one team ro carry 
the ball unopposed to whatever destination the nation 
desires than to have two teams working at cross purposes. 
A more rational defense is that many of the irriga-
tion projects are merely by-products of power and flood-
control projects which benefit the nation as a whole. 
Another argument in defense of these projects is 
that they increase the production of farm products that 
are not in surplus-vegetables, fruits, etc., rather than 
feed grains or wheat. This argument is only partly true; 
much of the increase in cotton production in recent years 
comes from new irrigated area in the Southwest, par-
ticularly California. Cotton production in California rose 
from an average of 1,488,000 bales in 1949-58 to 1,939,000 
in 1960-and increase of 451,000 bales. 24 This increase 
in production resulted almost entirely from an increase 
in yield per acre; acreage harvested increased only 1 per-
cent. 
Further research is needed to determine the accuracy 
of another view. This view is that crop production under 
irrigation is more efficient than existing marginal pro-
duction on dry land. On this basis, expenditures on ir-
rigation could be classed along with expenditures on re-
search, vocational education, fertilizer, hybrid seen com, 
etc.; all of these increase production, but enable farmers 
to produce more efficiently than before. The nation as a 
whole benefits from this more efficient production. 
Whether the benefits are greater or less than the 
cost is a complicated question for irrigation experts to 
answer; the authors do not feel competent to deal with 
it. The answer probably differs from project to project in 
any case. Pending more research on the subject, this sec-
tion remains inconclusive; but at least it indicates that 
the answer to the question whether irrigation projects are 
justified is not likely to be a simple yes or no. 
AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM 
SUBSIDIES 
Another obvious opportunity to reduce inputs in 
agriculture would be to reduce the subsidies under the 
Agricultural Conservation Program. 
This program subsidizes a number of conservation 
P!actices, most of which result in the long run in an in-
crease in agricultural production. 
These payments run into large figures. The annual 
tOtals for the United States as a whole since 1944 are 
shown in table 4. They have been running at more than 
$200 million in recent years. The average payment per 
payee in 1959 was $204. The relative importance of the 
different practices subsidized is shown in table 5. 
These subsidies are intended to conserve production 
resources, and this aim is in line with long-run objectives 
of efficiency and abundant production. But a large share 
of the projects subsidized increase production now at a 
time when it is already too abundant. 
24Agricultural Statistics 1962, USDA, p. 62. 
16 
TABLE 4-AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM: 
ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS FOR CARRYING OUT CONSER-
VATION PRACTICES, UNITED STATES, BY PROGRAM 
YEARS, 1944-1960-
Program year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 b 
Assistance 
Million dollars 
294 
231 
267 
245 
125 
224 
252 
246 
227 
190 
147 
193 
222 
216 
220 
210 
213 
arnc1udes assistance under the Naval Stores Conservation 
Program. Administrative expens€\S not included. Assist-
ance for supplemental (emergency) practices included 
since 1951. 
bPreliminary : 
t  
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TABLE 5- AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROQRAM: SELECTED CONSERVATION MEASURE PERFORMED, BY 
PROGRAM YEARS, UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES, 1950-59 AND 1936-59 TOTAL. 
otal 
Practice Unit 1950 1'955 1958 1959 1936-59a 
Construction of standard terraces 1, 000 acres 1,437 744 856 781 24 , 739 
Construction of standard terraces 1, 000 miles 75 37 44 38 1,345 
Construction of diversion and 
spreader terraces Miles 7' 084 5,131 4,826 4,191 121,553 
Establishment of sod waterwaysb Million sq. ft . 2 , 001 1,553 2,129 2, 011 27, 824 
Emergency tillage operations to 
control erosion on croplandb 1, 000 acres 2, 879 12,975 1,531 1 , 530 136, 935 
Stubble mulching 1, 000 acres 4, 049r 6,048 6,666 5,030 83 ,941 
Stripcropping not on the contour 1, 000 acres 7,279 944 320 283 104,546 
Stripcropping on the contour 1, 000 acres 249 219 167 152 5, 587 
Establishment of permanent 
vegetative coverb 1, 000 acres 6,459 1,221 2,475 2,462 89,432 
Establishment of additional 
acreages of vetetati ve cover 
in crop rotationbc 1, 000 acres 4,424 2, 051 1,400 1,124 246,401 
Improvement of an established 
vegetative cover for soil 
protection 1, 000 acres 2,165 1, 816 1,713 11 , 268 
Establishment of annual cover 
and green manure cropsb 1, 000 acres 18 , 460 7,666 6,908 5,460 415,924 
Application of liming materials to 
permit the use of conserving 
cropsbd 1, 000 tons 23 , 304 15, 126 16 , 845 15, 173 406 , 566 
Planting trees and shrubs 1, 000 acres 119 150 324 361 2,633 
Improvement of a stand of forestry 
trees for erosion control, water -
shed protection, or forestry 
purposes 1, 000 acres 30 133 321 304 1,934 
Control of competitive shrubs 
on range or pastureland 1, 000 acres 1,302 1,661 1,494 1, 841 40,247 
Drainage to permit a system of 
conservation farming 1 , 000 acres 2, 971 1 , 362 1,636 1,598 38,492 
Leveling irrigable land to control 
erosion and to conserve water 1 , 000 acres 377 375 346 341 6, 841 
Construction of dams, pits or ponds Number 93, 888 69, 146 62 , 472 58,828 1,639,064 
Constructing wells for livestock 
water as a means of protecting 
established vegetative cover Number 6,673 8,054 8,824 12,117 172, 584 
Developing springs or seeps for 
livestock water as a means of 
protecting established vegetative 
cover Number 1 , 050 2, 321 2, 262 2, 793 69,55i 
Installing pipelines for livestock 
water to improve grassland 
management 1, 000 lin. ft. 1 , 819 2, 131 2 , 291 2,996 36,777 
Deferred grazing to permit natural 
reseeding to increase vegetative 
cover 1, 000 acres 1, 969 2,742 5,265 4,313 214, 777 
aRounded totals of unrounded data . 
hrncluded supplemental (emergency) practices . 
cstarting in 1950, a portion of the acreage represents an increase over the normal farm acreage. 
dstandard ground limestone equivalent. Agricultural Statistics, table 9. 
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Part 2 
Controlling Specfi·c Inputs 
The general methods of controlling inputs in agri-
culture that are appraised above have their shortcomings 
-some of them, serious. Let us see how specific factor 
programs to control inputs of land, inputs of capital, and 
inputs of labor, have worked in the past, and how some 
new proposals might work in the future. 
This appraisal will be made in three separate sec-
tions-one for land, another for capital, and another for 
labor and management. 
A. LAND 
Although land accounts for a smaller percent of the 
costs of agricultural production than either labor or 
capital, most input-controlling programs seek to control 
land, because it is the easiest factor to take hold of. This 
is true of the present production control programs, and 
of several others that have been proposed but not adopted 
(for instance, mandatory land retirement) . Accordingly, 
this input, land, is considered first. Capital and labor are 
considered in later sections of this report. 
United States' experience with programs for con-
trolling agricultural production by controlling inputs has 
been analyzed in a number of publications, which are 
listed in a bibliography at the end of the present report. 
The purpose of the present report is not to appraise 
these programs further, as such, but to provide an over-
all perspective view and compare the estimated effects 
and costs of several alternative methods of controlling 
inputs. This comparison includes a number of different 
methods which have not been attempted yet, such as 
compulsory acreage allotments, government land pur-
chase, compulsory land rental, and other forms of land 
rental. 
Methods of controlling the input of land fall into 
two major groups: 
1. Specific crop acreage-reduction programs. 
These programs are designed to reduce the acreage 
of a specific crop (or closely related group of crops such 
as feed grains) by a flat uniform percentage cut on all 
farms which participate (such as the acreage allotment 
programs of the 1930's) or by a percentage cut of any 
figure chosen by the participant within a specified range 
(such as the emergency feed grains and wheat programs 
of 1961 and 1962). Some of these programs are backed 
up by marketing quotas. 
Most of these programs have run for only one year 
at a time. Future programs, however, could cover several 
18 
years at a time ; that is, contracts could extend over sev-
eral years. 
2. General land-retirement programs. 
These programs are designed to reduce the acreage 
of land in production regardless of what crop the land 
may be producing, such as the Conservation Reserve part 
of the Soil Bank program that was initiated in 1956. 
Contracts with farmers under this type of program us-
ually extend for three, five, or ten years. 
These two major methods are considered in order 
below. 
SPECIFIC CROP ACREAGE-REDUCTION PROGRAMS 
Specific crop acreage-reduction programs were first 
adopted in the United States during the great depression 
of the 1930's, They were designed to reduce the produc-
tion of specified crops by taking stated percentages of the 
cropland out of production. They were called acreage-
allotment programs. 
For most crops, the chief inducement for farmers to 
participate in the programs was that participation made a 
farmer eligible for non-recourse loans from the Com-
modity Credit Corporation at rates considerably higher 
than the open-market prices for the crops concerned. In 
the case of wheat, marketing quotas, accepted by a vote 
of more than two-thirds of the producers, were applied 
to all producers. 2 5 
Acreage-allotment programs have several character-
istic features , and farmers react to these features in such 
a way as to reduce production less than acreage is re-
duced. 
25For a detailed history of the programs, seeM. R. Bene-
dict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, Twen-
thieth Century Fund, New York, 1953. 
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1. Each participant is free to take out whichever 
acres of his cropland he wishes; naturally, he takes out his 
poorest cropland acres. 
2. There is enough substitutability among the fac-
tors of production in agriculture so that reductions in 
one factor, in this case, land, can be offset to a consider-
able extent by increases in the other factors, particularly 
fertilizer. 
In 1954, it was estimated that at the extent and 
level of use of fertilizer at that time, the rate of increase 
in average yield of all crops and pasture resulting from 
the last small increment of fertilizer applied, was such 
that one ton of plant nutrients substituted for the pro-
duction obtained from 10.7 acres. At the average rate of 
application for all crops and pasture in 1954, the value of 
the marginal product per ton of plant nutrients was esti-
mated at $681. The cost of the average ton of plant nu-
trients used in the United States in 1954 was about $230. 
This means that on the average, farmers would find in-
creased rates of application highly profitable on the basis 
of estimated long-time average prices of crops and about 
1954 prices for fertilizer. 26 
· Farmers evidently did find it profitable. Table 6 
shows that they continued to apply more and more tons 
of fertilizer after 1954, and that the plant nutrient con-
tent per ton also increased . . 
Farmers in effect substituted fertilizer for some of 
their acreage. Estimated fertilizer-acreage substitution 
curves for corn are shown in figure 7. 
It is estimated that the increase in the use of ferti-
lizer had the effect of increasing agricultural production 
more than the acreage-reduction programs reduced it. 27 
26 D. B. Ibach and R. C. Lindberg, "The Economic 
Position of Fertilizer Use in the United States" Ag. Inf. Bul. 
No. 202. United States Department of Agriculture. Novem-
ber 1958, pp. 9, 10. 
2wit has been estimated that 60 percent of the increase 
in crop production per acre from 1940-41 to 1950-51 and 70 
percent of the increase from 1951-52 to 1955 may be attri-
buted to the use of more fertilizer. Increased use of fertilizer 
added the equivalent of 22 million acres to total crop pro-
duction from 1940-41 to 1950-51 and 21 million acres during 
the period from 1951-52 to 1955. On the average, each ad-
ditional ton of plant nutrients in ferti lizer added the equiva-
lent of about seven acres of cropland to total crop production 
from 1940-41 to 1950-51 and about 19 acres from 1951-52 ro 
1955. 
"Estimates of the proportion of the use in crop produc-. 
cion per acre resulting from the use of additional fertilizer 
have not been made for the years 1956-60. An estimate of 40 
percent, however, would appear to be conservative. On this 
basis, additional cropland equivalent attributed to higher 
yields resulting from the use of more fertilizer amounts to 
19 
TABLE 6-FERTILIZ.ERS: QUANTITIES OF COMMERCIAL 
FERTILIZERS CONSUMED AND THEffi AVERAGE 
PLANT-NUTRIENT CONTENT, UNITED STATES, 
YEARS BEGINNING JULY 1 , 1944-60a 
All Fertilizers 
Available 
phosphoric 
Year QuantiE,y Nitrogen oxide Potash 
1, 000 tons Percent Percent Percent 
1944 13,466 4.68 10.05 5.42 
1945 15,128 4.63 10.28 5.34 
1946 16,839 4.65 10.31 5.10 
1947 17' 818 4.81 10 .40 5.17 
1948 18, 542 4. 96 10.47 5.79 
1949 1 8,343 5.48 10.63 6.01 
1950 20,991 5.89 10.05 6.57 
1951 22,432 6.34 9.80 7.05 
1952 23,413 6.99 9.70 7.42 
1953 22,774 8.11 9.81 7.96 
1954 22,726 8.63 10.05 8.25 
1955 22,194 8.71 10.13 8.45 
1956 22,709 9.40 10.15 8 .53 
1957 22,516 10.14 10.18 8.59 
1958 25,308 10.56 10.08 8.66 
1959 24,877 12.01 10.34 8. 66 
1960b 25 400 11.3 10.2 8.8 
alncludes Hawaii and Puerto Rico; Alaska included only in 
195_D-52 and 1959-60 ; also fertilizers distributed by 
Government agencies. 
bPreliminary. 
Source: Agricultural Statistics, 1961, p. 493. 
Fig. 7-Acreage-Fertilizer Combinations Needed to 
Produce the United States Corn Crop in 1975. 
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35 million acres for the 1955-60 period. This is substantially 
more than the 28 million acres in the conservation reserve in 
1960 or in the acreage reserve and conservation reserve in 
1957. If account also is taken of the fact that cropland in the 
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have not been ade for the years 1956-60. n esti ate of 40 
percent, ho ever, ould appear to be conservative. n this 
basis, additional cropland equivalent attributed to higher 
yields resulting fro  the use of ore fertilizer a ounts to 
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35 illion acres for the 1955-60 period. his is substantially 
ore than the 28 illion acres in the conservation reserve in 
1960 or in the acreage reserve and conservation reserve in 
1957. If account also is taken of the fact that cropland in the 
3. Third, most of the programs are voluntary. Non-
participants are free to expand their acreage and produc-
tion of the crops concerned, and this expansion offsets 
part of the reduction expected by the participants in the 
program. 
Non-participants in the 1961 feed grains program, 
for example, expanded their acreage of these crops, so 
that although participants reduced their acreage of these 
crops by 2 5.2 million acres, the reduction in the total 
acreage of these crops was only 20.4 million acres below 
the 1960 acreage. Feed grain production was reduced 
about 14 million tons (about 10 percent) below the 1960 
crop. 
4. Fourth, the producers of other crops are free to 
expand the production of those other crops; "cross-com-
pliance" usually has 'not been invoked. 
Farmers' reactions to the first three of these features 
of the specific commodity acreage control programs are 
the chief reasons why the reduction in the production of 
the specific crop is less than the reduction in the acreage 
of that crop. Farmers' reaction to the fourth kind of 
feature reduces the effect of the reduction of production 
of the specific crops that is accomplished, on total agri-
cultural production. 
Effects 
a. Acreage-allotment Programs. Several different 
analysts of the acreage-allotment programs of the 1930's 
came to the same conclusion-that except for tobacco, 
the programs did not have much effect on production. 
The programs after World War II had more effect, but 
since cross-compliance was nor included, the effect was 
mostly to shift production around from one crop to an-
other. 
The 1954 and 1955 corn-acreage programs, for ex-
ample, apparently had very little effect on total acreage 
in crops. They also had very little effect on corn acreage; 
but they did affect total feed-grain production by increas-
ing the production of other feed crops. 
Table 7 shows that the total United States acreage 
of corn decreased only 1 percent from 1953-1955. 28 The 
conservation reserve is below average in productivity, it is 
evident that since 1955 increased use of fertilizer has been 
more important in expanding crop production than the Con-
servation Reserve Program has been in reducing crop pro-
duction." (R. P. Christensen and R. 0. Aines, "Economic 
Efforts of Acreage Control Programs in the 1950's." ERS, 
USDA, Ag. Ec. Rpt. No. 18, pp. 23-24, October 1962.) 
28 U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Res. Serv. Effects of acreage 
allotment programs. U. S. Dept. Agr. Prod. Res. Rpt. 3. 
June 1956. See also: North Central Farm Management Re-
search Committee. Farmers reaction to acreage allotments. 
Ky. Agr. Exp. Sta. December 1955. 
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TABLE 7- CHANGES IN PRODUCTION, HARVESTED 
ACREAGE AND YIELDS FOR VARIOUS CROPS IN THE 
UNITED STATES BETWEEN 1953 AND 1955. 
Crop 
Wheat 
Cotton 
Corn 
Rice (1954-55) 
Oats 
Barley 
Grain sorghum 
Soybeans for beans 
Flaxeed 
Rye 
All tame hay 
Harvested 
acreage 
(percent) 
-30 
-31 
-1 
-28 
+4 
+66 
+105 
+26 
+10 
+49 
+3 
Total Yield 
production per acre 
(percent) (percent) 
-20 +15 
-11 +28 
no change +1 
-17 +16 
+30 +25 
+61 -3 
+113 +4 
+38 +9 
+11 +1 
+61 +8 
+7 +3 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Res. Serve. Effects of 
acreage allotment programs. U. S. Dept. Agr . Prod. Res. 
Rpt. 3. June 1956. p . 6. 
small size of the decrease in corn acreage was chiefly due 
to the lack of compliance by many corn farmers. Most 
of the corn farmers who did not comply with corn allot-
ments intended to feed their corn and, therefore, were 
not interested in complying for eligibility in the price-
support program. Reductions in corn acres made by those 
who complied with the program were just about offset 
by increases in corn acres made by farmers who did not 
comply . 
Table 7 also shows that the corn program had little 
or no effect on corn production. But the programs for 
wheat and cotton had subsantial effects on total feed-
grains production. 
Compliance with the wheat and cotton programs 
was high. Most of the acres diverted from wheat, cotton 
and corn went into feed-grain production, soybeans and 
pasture. Iowa corn farmers, who complied with corn al-
lotments, grew more soybeans and oats. Wheat acres 
were reduced by 30 percent. These acres were mainly 
diverted to grain sorghum in Kansas and to barley in 
other major wheat-producing regions. The acres which 
were taken out of cotton production were shifted mainly 
to the production of soybeans, corn, grain sorghum and 
barley. The diversions of acres from allotment crops to 
feed grains other than corn resulted in a 10 percent in-
crease in the total production of feed grains. This in-
crease in feed-grains production was not necessarily a net 
addition to the total quantity of grain fed, because some 
of the wheat would have been fed anyway. But the in-
crease had some depressing effect on feed-grain prices. 
From 1952 to 1955, the harvested acreage of the 
crops under acreage controls-wheat, cotton, peanuts, 
rice and tobacco-decreased by 33 million acres, but the 
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acreage in other crops increased by 25 million acres 
The production of the controlled crops decreased by 12 
percent, but the production of the other crops increased 
enough to more than offset this, so that total crop pro-
duction increased. Thus, the producers of these crops 
transferred a substantial part of their surplus problem to 
the producers of the nonbasic crops, chiefly the feed 
grains other than corn, for which price supports were 
provided without restrictions on production. 
b. The 1961 and 1962 Feed Grains and Wheat 
Programs. In 1961, the Congress set up an emergency 
program for feed grains and another for wheat. Under 
these programs, each corn grower, for example, was offer-
ed 50 percent of the estimated value of the crop per acre 
to keep 20 percent of the corn acreage on his farm out of 
production, and 60 percent for the next 20 percent, up to 
a total limit of 40 percent. The level of price support for 
corn was raised from $1.06 to $1.20, although loans at 
this rate were available only to participants, and only on 
the "normal production" on each farm . 
The rental rates under the 1961 feed grains program 
differed from farm to farm according to the productivity 
of the individual farms, more than the rates under the 
Conservation Reserve program. The rates ranged from an 
average of $7.00 per acre in Florida to over $40 per acre 
in Connecticut. They averaged about $31 per acre for the 
United States as a whole. This was more than twice the 
$13.50 average rate under the Conservation Reserve pro-
gram. 
More than a million farmers signed up in the 1961 
feed grain program, representing 55 percent of the base 
acreages of those crops; 25.2 million acres were held out 
of production by participants. Some of the non-partici-
pants increased their acreage. The net reduction in acres 
from 1960 was 20.4 million, equal to about 16 percent. 
The emergency programs were extended with small 
changes in 1962, with similar results to those in 1961. 
The 1961 and 1962 feed grains and wheat programs 
were effective in reducing production as well as acreage. 
The 1961 feed grains program reduced feed grain acreage 
on participant's farms about 25 percent. The feed grain 
harvested acreage reduction for the country as a whole 
was about 16.5 percen:: (non-participants increased their 
acreage). Participants, however, took out their poorest 
acres and applied more inputs on the acres in crops, and 
non-participants maintained or increased their produc-
tion, so that the reduction in feed-grains production was 
only about 10 percent below production in 1960. Stocks 
of feed grains were reduced also. These things are shown 
in figure 8. 
If the weather had been about average in 1961, feed 
grains production would have declined more than the 
actual 10 percent decline which took place. But the 
weather in the Corn Belt in 1961 was unusually good 
for corn. "The 1961 growing season was more nearly 
optimum for corn than in any (other) year of the study, 
1935 to 1961", because of plentiful rains in July and rela-
tively cool August temperatures. 29 
L. M. Thompson, the author of the study reported 
above, concluded that the weather in the Corn Belt was 
291. M. Thompson, "An Evaluation of Weather Factors 
in the Production of Corn," CAEA Report 12T, Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa, 1962, p. 20. 
Fig. 8-U. S. Government and Other Feed Grain Stocks. 
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above average each year after 1957, and that "had we 
experienced average weather after 1957 in the Corn Belt, 
there would have been no surplus corn produced . . .. 
"In other words, our continued build-up of surplus 
feed graim since 1957 was associated with a favorable weather 
cycle. Just how long this favorable cycle will continue is 
beyond our present scientific approach to answer. 
"We must continue these studies in order that we 
can distinguish between the influence of weather and 
technology. We would make a serious mistake to ignore 
weather and assign the trend in yields from 1950 to 1960 
solely to technology. Our more recent statistical studies 
show half this trend to be due to technology and half due to 
weather. "30 
If further research confirms the existence of cycles 
in the weather, this would cast production controls in a 
new role. In this role, production controls would supple-
ment storage programs as a means of evening-out year-
to-year variations in feed grain supplies caused by varia-
tions in the weather. In the past, these storage programs 
have been based on the belief that variations in the 
weather are random and irregular, and that the average 
period of variation is short, so that a small crop would 
follow a big crop within a few years; thus the excess 
supplies from good years would have to be carried for 
only a few years before they would be needed to add to 
a small crop. But if weather comes in cycles, or even in 
runs of irregular sequences, it might be cheaper to reduce 
stocks by reducing production for a year or two during 
a good-weather cycle or run, such as that from 1957 to 
1962, rather than by continued storage year after year. 
Costs 
The total rents paid out under the 1961 feed grains 
programs, for the United States as a whole, amounted to 
$782 million. Administrative costs were $42 million. 
These amounts add up to $824 million. 
How much did this program reduce feed-grains pro-
duction? 
An estimate of the reduction in feed-grain produc-
tion due to the 1961 feed grain program can be made by 
comparing the actual production in 1961, not with 1960 
production (for other things-weather, for example- af-
fected production in 1961 besides the 1961 program) but 
with what would have been produced if the previous 
price support programs at 65 percent of parity and no 
production controls had been in effect, instead of the 
1961 emergency feed grain programs. '-. 
The following procedure was used to estimate wha! 
would have been produced in 1961 if the old program 
had been in effect, instead of the feed grain program. 
1. The March 1, 1961 planting intentions were used. 
2. The percentage of planted acreage of feed grain 
crops harvested for grain was assumed to be the same as 
in the 1960 crop year. 
3. The December 1, 1961 estimate of crop yields was 
used, except for corn. The corn yields, an estimated 2.5 
bushels per acre, based on opinions obtained in a survey 
of Extension personnel, farmers and commercial farm 
managers in five midwest states, was deducted from the 
1961 yields to compensate for land selection, increased 
fertilizer use, and timeliness of operation resulting from 
the 1961 program. 
On this basis, it was estimated as shown in table 8 
that feed grain production would have been 166.9 mil-
lion tons in 1961 without the feed grain program. The 
actual 1961 feed-grain production was 140.6 million tons. 
In other words, it was estimated that the 1961 feed grain 
program reduced feed-grain production by 26.3 million 
tons. This is equal to 939 million bushels when converted 
to corn equivalent on a weight basis. 
Payments to farmers, and administrative costs, 
amounted to $824 million in 1961. For this outlay, the 
program purchased a reduction in feed-grain production 
estimated at 939 million bushels of corn equivalent. This 
amounted to about 1.14 bushels per dollar of program 
cost. With corn at $1 per bushel, this would amount ro 
$1.14 worth of production-reduction per dollar of pro-
gram cost. 
30L. M. Thompson, "How Weather has Affected our 
Feed Grain Surplus," September 1962, Better Farming Methods. 
TABLE 8-ESTIMATES OF WHAT 1961 CROP PRODUCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDER THE 1958-60 PROGRAM: 
Percent 
Prospective harvested Harvested 
1961 for grain acres 
Crop 1, 000 acres 1960 1961 
Corn 82,405 87.7 72,269.2 
Oats 32,480 84.5 27,445.6 
Barley 15,427 89.3 13,776.3 
Grain Sorghum 18,822 79 . 6 14,982. 3 
Total of 4 
feed grains 
1961 yield 1,000 
per acre Bushels 
59.3 4, 285, "564 
42.1 1, 155,460 
30.3 417,422 
43.8 656,225 
22 
Pounds 
per 
bushel 
56 
32 
48 
56 
1,000 
Pounds 
239, 991,156 
36,974,712 
20,036,268 
36, 748,615 
Tons 
119, 995, 578 
18,487,356 
10,018,134 
18,374,307 
166,875,375 
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The USDA estimates that the 1961 feed grains pro-
gram reduced corn production by 617 rclllion bushels.:n 
The payments for corn acreage diversions were 645 mil-
lion. On the basis of corn at $1.00 per bushel, their esti-
mate indicates that the 1961 feed grains program reduced 
corn production worth 96 cents per dollar of program 
cost. This is lower than our estimate. For grain sorghum 
the USD A estimated that the 1961 feed grain program 
reduced production by 136 million bushels. The pay-
ments for grain sorghum acreage diversion were 137 mil-
lion dollars. With sorghum grain priced at 90 cents per 
bushel, this indicates a 90 cent reduction in grain sor-
ghum production for each dollar of acreage diversion pay-
ments. 
This was only the immediate cost. It will be offset 
to a considerable extent by the reduction in losses which 
the CCC incurred and will incur for storage charges and 
for deterioration of grain in storage, on the crops that 
were not produced. The US D A states: "According to 
estimates for the 1959 fiscal year, government price-sup-
port losses on acquisitions averaged $2.70 per bushel for 
wheat and $1.75 for corn. This is more than the origi-
nal values per bushel. For most other crops, losses 
amounted to more than half the amount the Government 
paid for these crops."32 
GENERAL LAND-RETIREMENT PROGRAMS 
The Soil Bank program initiated in 1955 included 
two parts. One part was an Acreage Reserve program, 
which was a specific commodity program on an annual 
basis, to take out acreages of specified crops. The other 
part was a Conservation Reserve program, designed to 
retire all types of cropland, regardless of crop, under con-
tracts running from three to ten years in length. 
The number of acres under Acreage Reserve con-
tracts each year is shown in table 9. The Acreage Reserve 
program was discontinued after 1958. 
TABLE 9-ACREAGE RESERVE ACRES AND CONSER-
VATION RESERVE ACRES, ANNUALLY 1955-60 . 
Acreage Conservation 
Year Reserve Reserve 
1956 12,212 1,429 
1957 21,354 6,427 
1958 17,158 9,887 
1959 22,422 
1960 28 , 660 
I 
Source: Agricultural Statistics, USDA, Annual volumes. 
3
' USDA, The 1961 feed grains program (Mimeo), 
Washington D . C., 1962. 
32Christensen and Aines, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
23 
The Conservation Reserve part of the program was 
a general land-retirement program; it took out agricul-
tural cropland regardless of crop. It began in 1956 and 
was modified and expanded in 1959. The number of 
acres under Conservation Reserve contracts each year 
from 1956 to 1960 is also shown in table 9. Figure 9 
shows that participation was heaviest in the low-yield 
Great Plains states. The correlation between land value 
per acre, representing the productivity of the land, and 
percentage participation, with states as units, was -.53. 33 
It is estimated that the yield per acre on the cropland in 
the Conservation Reserve averaged about 30 percent 
lower than the average for all cropland in 1960.3 4 
The Conservation Reserve program rented land out 
of production under three, five, or ten year contracts. By 
1960, farmers participated in the program to the extent 
of 28.7 million acres; about 70 percent of the acreage un-
der contract consisted of whole farms. No new contracts 
were written after 1960. The existing contracts continued 
to run on to their individual termination dates. 
Effects 
Table 10 and figure 10 show that the total acreage 
of "crops planted or grown" in the United States de-
creased from 354.3 million in 1955 to 329.1 in 1960, or 
by 25.2 million acres. This is almost as much as the 28.7 
million acres put into the Conservation Reserve. 
Table 10 and figure 11 , however, show that the 
acreage harvested declined only 12.1 million acres-less 
than half as much as the acreage under contract. 
The difference between the behavior of these two 
series, acreage planted and acreage harvested, resulted 
chiefly from the changes in acreage abandoned; these in 
turn resulted from changes in weather. The rest of the 
difference resulted from some "crop" land being put into 
the program that was not really in crops before. 
From 1950 to 1956, droughts in the plains states 
caused total acreage abandoned to average about 20 mil-
lion acres. Before 1950, abandonment had usually run 
only a little above 10 million acres, and after 1956, it de-
clined below 10 million. During 1956, the last year of 
the droughts, acreage abandonment was still high, and 
acres harvested declined by the same amount as the acres 
put into the Soil Bank. The lower part of figure 11 
33 R. Heifner, The Conservation Reserve Program as a 
Means of Controlling Agricultural Production, unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, Iowa State University, 1963. 
34Christensen and Aines, op. cit., p. 26. 
Aines also has made an unpublished estimate that the 
value of the reduction per acre under the Conservation Re-
serve in 1960 was about $31 to $35 per acre, while the value 
under the feed grains program, for corn, was about $50 per 
acre. (Letter to the senior author, November 6, 1962). 
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Fig. 11-Total U. S. Acreage Harvested and Amounts 
Put in the Acreage and Conservation Reserves and 
Acreage Abandoned. 
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TABLE 10-PLANTED AND HARVESTED ACREAGES OF CROPS, UNITED STATES, 1944- 60. 
59 crops 
Year harvesteda 
(1, 000 acres) 
1944 352,868 
1945 345,546 
1946 343,012 
1947 346' 380 
1948 348 ,047 
1949 352 , 286 
1950 336,437 
1951 33~,079 
1952 341, 313 
1953 340,660 
1954 338,214 
1955 332 , 880 
1956 318,579 
1957 318,676 
1958 320,753 
1959 322,674 
1960 320,823 
59 crops 
planted or 
grownb 
(1, 000 acres) 
366,099 
356,883 
353,522 
356,408 
359 , 807 
365,490 
353,246 
362 ,9 22 
356,093 
360,461 
354,806 
354,384 
345,294 
333,718 
330,054 
335,390 
32&, 154 
Crops planted 
minus crops 
harvested 
(1, 000 acres) 
13,231 
11, 337 
10 ,510 
10 ,028 
11, 760 
13,204 
16, 809 
26 , 843 
14,780 
19,801 
16,592 
21,504 
26, 715 
15,042 
9,30 1 
12,716 
8,331 
aTotals are for crops shown in preceding columns, omitting alfalfa seed, red clover seed, alsike clover seed, and lespedeze 
seed. These are included in the count of crops, but the acreage is not included because mostly duplicated in the hay acre-
age; the acreage of peanut hay, largely duplicated in peanuts picked and threshed, h as been deducted. Other crops not in-
cluded are hops, spelt, hemp, velvetbeans, various legumes and other crops harvested by livestock, minor crops, and 
fruits and nuts. The acreages shown include some crops harvested in succession from the same land. 
bpreceding column plus estimates of acreage planted and not harvested . 
Source: U . S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Crop Reporting Board, Annual Crop Summary, 
December 1960. 
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shows, on an expanded vertical scale at lower right, that 
only after 1956, when normal weather returned, did acres 
harvested plus Soil Bank acres increase. Presumably, if 
the droughts had continued, or if they had not happened 
at all during the period preceding the Soil Bank, the re-
duction in acreage harvested would have been almost as 
great as the acreage in the Soil Bank. It would not have 
been quite as great, for there is some evidence that some 
farmers "fudged" a bit under their contracts, and pur in 
some land that was not really producing crops before.3 5 
The Conservation Reserve program took out 8 per-
cent of the total cropland used in 1960. The USDA esti-
mates that the total value of the normal crop production 
at prevailing prices on all land in the program was 
equivalent to 4.5 percent of the total farm value of all 
crops produced in 1960.36 
The long term Conservation Reserve contracts, up to 
10 years in length, along with the features permitting 
whole farms to be pur into the program, helped partici-
pants to make long-run adjustments. Most of them were 
older people, or were having trouble making a go of 
farming. The program helped make it possible for these 
people to retire or find nonfarm jobs. Thus, the program 
helped directly to reduce the number of farmers as well 
as farms, more than the specific commodity programs 
did; the latter took out only parts of farms. 
The rental rates per acre, under the Conservation 
Reserve program, differed according to differences in the 
productivity of land. They did not differ as much as the 
differences in profit per acre, however, as shown in figures 
12 and 13, where profit per acre is estimated by the value 
of land and buildings per acre. 
Thus, the Conservation Reserve program over-paid 
for poor land relative to good land. Accordingly, there 
was a general tendency for more poor land than good 
land to go into the program. This is shown by the loca-
tion of the participation, by counties in figure 9 and by 
stare areas in table 11. It is estimated that the yield per 
acre on the cropland in the Conservation Reserve aver-
aged about 30 percent lower than the average for all 
cropland in 1960.37 This is not a necessary feature of gen-
3 5 H. E. Conklin and J. V. B. Rice, "The People Who 
Have Land in the Soil Bank in New York State," Dept. of 
Ag. Econ. , Cornell Univ. Ithaca, New York, February, 1961. 
See also Marlowe Taylor, "The Conservation Reserve Program 
in New Mexico" Res. Dept. 54, USDA, and Ag. Exp. Sta., 
New Mexico State Univ. pp. 23-24. 
According to a report by the General Accounting Of-
fice, 23 percent of the estimated 23 million acres under Con-
servation Reserve contracts in June 1959 had been previously 
devoted to hay and pasture, had been idle or summer fal-
lowed, or had a hisrory of crop failure. 
36Christensen and Aines, op. cit., p. 26. 
37 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Fig. 12-Relation Between Basic Rental Rate Per Acre 
and Average Value of Land Per Acre, by States, 1956. 
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TABLE 11-PERCENTAGE OF CROPLAND IN THE 1960 
CONSERVATION RESERVEl AND THE 1961 FEED GRAINS 
PROGRAM, 2 BY REGIONS, UNITED STATES . 
1960 1961 
conservation feed grains · 
Region reserve program 
Percent Percent 
Northeast 5.3 16.3 
Corn Belt 3.1 23.4 
Lake States 7.5 20.9 
Appalachian 3.9 24 . 7 
Southeast 9.3 15.6 
Delta States 10.5 15.7 
Southern Plains 9.8 26.7 
Northern Plains 6. 7 26 . 3 
Mountain 8.2 25 . 8 
Pacific M 23.4 
United States 6.2 23 . 4 
1Total cropland reported by 1954 Census of Agriculture (6) . 
2Percent of base acreage for corn and grain sorghums in 
feed program. 
Source: R . P. Christensen and R. 0. Aines, "Economic 
Effects of Acreage Control Programs in the 1950's"; Agri-
cultural Economic Report No. 18. USDA, ERS, FED.· 
pp. 11 and 50, October 1962. Data on the feed grains pro-
gram direct from USDA. 
eral land retirement programs; the rental rates could be 
set more closely in line with profit-producing ability, so 
that good, medium and poor land alike would go into 
the program, as in fact it did into the emergency feed 
grain programs. 
The tendency for poor land to be put into the Con-
servation Reserve program, and the fact that 70 percent 
of this land was in whole farms, caused a drastic reduc-
tion in the number of farms and farmers in some low-
yield areas. Participation in New Mexico, for example, 
was 35 percent. This retirement of low-yielding land ap-
peared to be in line with long-run goals of the most ef-
ficient location and utilization of productive resources for 
the nation as a whole, but it had a severe effect on the 
community schools, stores, churches, etc., in some of 
these areas. This was not true of the specific commodity 
programs, which took a bite out of each participant's 
farm but did not accept more than 40 percent of any one 
farm. 
Costs 
The "payments approved for rental and conservation 
measures" (most for seeding to grass) under the Con-
servation Program in 1960 totaled $367 million. 
27 
The USDA estimates that the reduction in value of 
crops produced per dollar of rental payment averaged 
$2.80 in 1960.38 This is more than twice as high as the 
$1.20 per dollar of program cost estimated above for the 
1961 emergency feed grains program. 
Why was this? 
The costs of land retirement depends not only upon 
the amount of land that is withdrawn but also upon the 
accompanying adjustments in the other agricultural in-
puts. We shall first examine the conditions for the in-
dividual farmer for participation in the Conservation Re-
serv1 as they bear upon the costs of retiring different 
grades of land. 
Conditions for Individual Participation 
in Land Retirement Programs 
For the individual farmer, certain capital and labor 
inputs are fixed with respect to Soil Bank participation, 
and others are variable. For example, the depreciation on 
his machines may be a production cost which cannot be 
terminated upon entering the Conservation Reserve, 
whereas fuel and lubricant costs can be terminated. To 
make Soil Bank participation more profitable than crop 
production for the individual farmer, the Conservation 
Reserve payment must cover all of his fixed production 
costs. The extent to which certain costs are fixed or 
variable with respect to Conservation Reserve participa-
tion varies from farm to farm. A farmer who has no off-
farm job opportunity may treat his own labor as a fixed 
cost, whereas, a farmer who does have an off-farm job 
opportunity may treat his own labor as a variable cost. 
When two farms are similar in other respects and one 
exhibits lower fixed costs of production than the other, 
38Chrisrensen and Aines, op. tit. , p. 27. Estimates of this 
type are, by necessity , based upon assumptions about the 
crop acreages and yields that would have been experienced 
without the Soil Bank. The estimates reported by Christen-
sen and Aines were based upon the assumption that the base 
period crop acreages on the Soil Bank land would have been 
continued in the absence of the program. They also assumed 
that the Soil Bank did not result in any changes in crop 
acreages and labor and capital used on the land not in the 
program. Alternative sets of assumptions may produce dif-
ferent estimates of the amount of production-reduction per 
dollar of payment. For example, a different estimation pro-
cedure indicated a $1.71 reduction in production per dollar 
of Soil Bank rental payments for five midwest states in 1960. 
(See: Heifner, Richard G., The Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram as a Means of Controlling Agricultural Production, un-
published Ph.D. thesis, Iowa State University, 1963 ). The 
USDA estimate was selected for use in this report as the 
most widely accepted estimate pertaining to the country as a 
whole. 
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the farmer with the lower fixed costs will find Conserva-
tion Reserve participation profitable at a lower payment 
rate than the other farmer will. 
Land Productivity and Land Retirement 
Certain capital and labor costs, such as seedbed 
preparation and planting costs, tend to be approximately 
the same for the same crop on soils of differing produc-
tivities. We would expect such costs to absorb a smaller 
fraction of total product on the more productive land 
than on the less productive land, leaving a larger frac-
tion of the total product to be imputed to land as rent 
in the more productive areas. This is illustrated by figure 
14, Section A, based on hypothetical data, where the line 
T-T' shows the relation between total costs and total 
product. If this is the case, and the government paid only 
for the rent earned by the land, the cost of eliminating 
production by means of a land rental program would 
tend to be higher on the more productive land than on 
the less productive land. 
Figure 14, Section B, based on county 1959 census 
data from a sample of 80 counties in five midwest states, 
provides some empirical confirmation of the relationships 
between costs and productivity hypothesized in figure 14, 
Section A. The region studied included Iowa, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. 39 The cost 
estimates were constructed from regression analyses of the 
various individual costs. The figure illustrates the tend-
ency for land rent to be larger in proportion co gross 
Fig. 14a-The Hypothetical Relationship Between 
Costs and Total Product for Land. 
l&J 
0:: 
oY 
ct 
0:: 
w 
a.. 
(I) 
0:: 
ct 
...J 
...J 
0 
0 
.. 
(I) 
~ 
(I) 
0 
0 
z 
0 
~ 
0 
:::> 
0 
r' 
t VARIABLE COSTS FOR 
"LABOR AND CAPITAL 
~0 ~-------------------------------Q.. 0 X 
GROSS PRODUCT, DOLLARS PER- ACRE 
28 
product for the more productive land chan for the less 
productive land in the region. 
From the results illustrated in figure 14 some con-
ditional comparisons can be made between the costs for 
retiring various grades of land. For example, for land 
with a gross product of $20 per acre the indicated rent 
constitutes about 15 percent of gross product. For land 
with a gross product of $40 per acre the indicated rent 
makes up approximately 22 percent of gross product. If 
production can be controlled by paying only for the rent 
earned by land, each dollar in payments would eliminate 
$6.66 worth of production on land with a $20 gross pro-
duct or $4.54 worth of production on land with a $40 
gross product. However, if the payment must cover not 
only land rent but also part of the capital and labor 
costs, the production-reduction per dollar of payment is 
less and the difference in the cost of controlling produc-
tion on different grades of land declines . If the govern-
ment payment must cover machine depreciation and 
operator and family labor costs in addition to land rent, 
a dollar of payment would eliminate approximately $1.60 
w~rch of production on all grades of land. 
39The data and the methods employed in analyzing them 
are explained in Appendix A of R. Heifner, The Conserva-
tion Reserve Program as a Means of Controlling Agricul-
tural Production, unpublished Ph.D. thesis , Iowa State Uni-
versity, 1963. 
Fig. 14b-The Structure of Crop Production Costs for 
Five Midwest States. 
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The fixed costs of production tend to vary among 
farms of the same productivity because of differences in 
the flexibility of the labor and capital used on the various 
farms. Consequently, the cost of eliminating production 
differs among farmers of a given level of productivity. A 
program to reduce production at the minimum cost to 
government would not concentrate solely on poor land 
or on good land initially, but would take out those farms 
or fields in each area on which production could be re-
duced at the lowest cost. Over the long run , as all in-
puts except land become variable, participation would 
become more concentrated in the less productive areas. 
Effects of Various Payment Rate Formulas for Land 
Retirement 
Once the average level of land retirement payments 
is established, the problem of setting payment rates for 
areas of differing productivities arises. Three different 
rate formulas may be considered. First is a constant level 
of payment per acre for all grades of land. Second is a 
formula prescribing payment rates that are proportional 
to land rent. Third is a formula which sets rates propor-
tional to gross product or yield. 
The constant rate formula would involve paying 
more per bushel of production eliminated on the poor 
land than on the good land. It would result in high 
levels of participation in the less productive areas and 
low levels of participation in the more productive areas. 
A program to reduce production at the lowest gov-
ernment cost per bushel of production eliminated would 
offer the same payment for an additional bushel of pro-
duction control on each farm or each field . This would 
imply the use of a payment rate formula which takes 
into account differences in productivity. The choice be-
tween a formula which sets rates proportional to land 
rent and a formula which sets payment rates proportional 
to yield or gress product depends upon how the program 
is expected to affect capital and labor. To reduce produc-
tion at the lowest cost per bushel, payments should equal 
the same percentage of the value of the inputs removed 
from agriculture on each type of land. For a program 
where there is a tendency for the labor and capital to 
stay in agriculture, payment rates should be approxi-
mately proportional to land rent. For a program that ef-
fectively removes labor and capital along with the land, 
payments should be set proportional to gross product or 
yield. For a program which removes only part of the 
labor and capital from agriculture some intermediate rate 
formula is indicated. 
An alternative goal for land retirement would be to 
maximize the transfer of labor and capital out of agri-
culture in order to promote more efficient use of re-
sources in the long run. This would imply setting pay-
ment rates proportional to the value of capital and labor 
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removed; i.e., paying the same price for a dollar's worth 
of capital and labor removed on each farm. For a part-
farm program which has little effect on capital and labor 
transfer, this goal is not relevant. For a whole-farm pro-
gram which is effective in transferring capital and labor, 
this goal implies setting payment rates proportional to 
capital and labor costs on the various grades of land. 
The payment rates for the Soil Bank in 1959 and 
1960 were based upon a composite index reflecting both 
net productivity and gross productivity, plus a constant 
for all grades of land intended to cover costs which 
would continue on the retired land. The constant had 
the effect of raising payment rates in the low producing 
areas and lowering rates in the high producing areas rela-
tive to the rates ·indicated by the productivity index by 
itself This resulted in higher payments per bushel of pro-
duction eliminated on the less productive land than on 
the more productive land. It appears that more produc-
tion control could have been obtained at the same gov-
ernment cost if the constant had not been included in 
the rate formula. Participation would have been some-
what lower in the less productive areas but would prob-
ably have remained higher there than in the highly pro-
ductive areas. 
Eventual Net Cost of the 1961 Emergency Feed 
Grain Program 
It was estimated earlier in this report that the 1961 
emergency feed grain program reduced production worth 
$1.14 per dollar of program cost -less than half as high 
as the estimate of $2.80 for the 1960 Conservation Re-
serve program. 
But this is not the final cost. Much of this initial 
cost will be offset in future years, because the USDA will 
incur lower storage costs because it will not have to store 
the feed grain that was not produced under the program. 
An additional reduction in cost will result because the 
USDA will not incur any loss from deterioration of the 
grain in storage. 
The extent of this reduction is indicated in a recent 
report by the Secretary of Agriculture: 40 
"Grain surpluses are being reduced. CCC holdings 
of wheat and feed grains are over one billion bushels less 
than the peak quantities held in 1961 before the new pro-
grams were effective. It means that 1964 budget for carry-
ing charges on these grains will be $264 million less than 
• was spent in fiscal 1961 ... or $770,000 per day . .. and 
$813 million less than our costs would have been this 
year had we done nothing to change the pre-1961 pro-
grams." 
40 0rville L. Freeman, Farm Forum, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, Raddison Hotel, 12 Noon, March 4, 1963. 
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 alter ati e al f r la  retire e t l  e to 
a i ize t e tra sfer f la r a  ca ital t f a ri-
culture in order to r te ore efficient use f re-
sources in the long run. his ould i ply setting pay-
ent rates proportional to the value of capital and labor 
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re oved; i.e., paying the sa e price for a dollar's orth 
of capital and labor re oved on each far . or a part-
far  progra  hich has little effect on capital and labor 
transfer, this goal is t relevant. or a hole-far  pro-
ra  ic  is effecti e i  tra sferri  ca ital a  la r, 
t is al i lies setti  a e t rates r rti al to 
ca ital a  la r c sts  t e ari s ra es f la . 
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ra s." 
4°O le . ree an, ar  oru , inneapolis, in-
nesota, addison otel, 12 oon, arch 4, 1963. 
The final cost of the feed grain program as compared 
with the cost of a "no controls" program, therefore, will 
depend on the eventual recovery value of grain which 
would have been acquired in CCC inventory. No one 
can say in any exact sense that this would have been. 
The CCC realized an average of $.995 per bushel for 
498.8 million bushel of corn sold to meet certificate de-
mands through January 26, 1962. But on the basis of ex-
perience in earlier years, a value of only $.53 per bushel 
could be expected. The net cost of the program therefore 
depends on what the recovery value of the corn and other 
feed grains will be, and this is unknown. 
The same sort of thing is true of the cost of the 
Conservation Reserve program, although the question is 
more complicated there on account of the larger number 
of commodities concerned. It is almost impossible, there-
fore to make an accurate comparison of the eventual 
costs of the two programs. 
APPRAISAL OF POSSIBLE NEW METHODS TO 
CONTROL THE INPUT OF LAND 
The foregoing over-all appraisal of the two chief 
kinds of methods that have been put into effect to con-
trol the input of land in agriculture paves the way for 
us to appraise several other methods that have been pro-
posed but not adopted. 
Mandatory Land Retirement 
Most of the programs for controlling the input of 
land in the United States have been voluntary: participa-
tion has been obtained by the government offering in-
ducements to farmers to participate, such as renting acres 
our of production. 
This is not the only way to do it. A mandatory (that 
is, compulsory) program might be considered-manda-
tory in the same sense that wheat marketing quotas, for 
example, are mandatory in that if more than two-thirds 
of the producers of the commodity vote for programs, 
they become compulsory on all producers of the com-
modity. 
A mandatory land retirement program of this sort is 
no idle dream. It actually reached the stage of proposed 
legislation in 1962, bur was defeated in the House by a 
narrow margin. 
The reason for considering this mandatory feature 
is that without it, non-participants increase their acreage 
and production of the crop and nullify part of the re-
ducing effect of the program. Accordingly, rental pay-
ments have to be set high so as to induce high participa-
tion and keep the numbers of participants low; in addi-
tion, the percentage acreage reduction has to be set high, 
since part of the reduction will be reduced by the in-
crease in acreage and production by the non-participants. 
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What might be the effects and costs of a mandatory 
land retirement program of this sort ? And what difficul-
ties might stand in the way? 
Estimated Effects and Costs of a ·Mandatory Pro-
gram. The mandatory feature applied to programs that 
would take out parts of farms like the current feed grains 
and wheat programs, would have one obvious and im-
mediate effect: It would prevent non-participants from 
expanding their acreage and offsetting part of the reduc-
tion affected by the participants. The programs would not 
"hold an umbrella" of price supports over non-partici-
pants as well as participants; there would be no non-par-
ticipants. 
Accordingly, the percentage reduction required by 
the program could be set lower than with a purely 
voluntary program. Under the 1961 feed grains program, 
for example, the government paid for, and participants 
took out, 25 .2 million acres ; but non-participants in-
creased their acreage, and the net reduction was only 20.4 
million acres. If the program had been mandatory, the 
government would only have had to pay for the 20.4 
million acres. 
At $31 per acre, this would have reduced the cost 
of the total rental payments $142 million, that is , from 
$782 million to $640 million. This is a substantial sum; 
it amounts to a reduction of about 18 percent. 
In addition to this reduction in numbers of acres 
paid for, a mandatory program might get along on a 
lower rental rate per acre than a voluntary program, or 
none at all. 
It is difficult to estimate how much lower the rate 
might be under a mandatory plan than under a volun-
tary plan. Under a voluntary plan, the rate has to be high 
enough to provide more income than the other alterna-
tive of staying out of the plan and increasing production. 
But under a mandatory plan, the second alternative would 
not be open; the only alternative would be no program 
at all. This would be less attractive than the alternative 
of staying out of a voluntary program and capitalizing 
on the beneficial effects of the participants' reduced pro-
duction. Accordingly, it seems likely that a compulsory 
plan could get along with lower rental rates than a volun-
tary plan. 
One other consideration, however, might work in 
the opposite direction. The rental rate would have to be 
high enough to induce two-thirds of the producers to 
vote for the plan, in order for the program to be manda-
tory on all producers. Under the 1961 voluntary feed 
grains program, producers representing about 56 percent 
of the feed grain producers signed up. The rate under a 
mandatory plan would have to be high enough to get 
the percentage of farmers who would vote for the plan 
up to two-thirds. This would tend to offset some of the 
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reducing effect of the rate of the other considerations 
given above. 
It would be possible to cut this Gordian knot simply 
by legislation. That is, legislation might be passed similar 
to the earlier voluntary acreage-allotment programs, un-
der which the government did not make rental payments 
at all. The inducement to participate consisted in the fact 
that participants were eligible for CCC loans at rates 
above open-market levels , while non-participants were 
not eligible. 
This form of reward could not be used under a 
mandatory plan, since there would be no non-participants 
then. But some form of reward might be needed to in-
duce congressmen to vote for the plan and farmers to 
support it. Perhaps the direct payments tried out on a 
small scale in the 1963 feed grains and wheat programs 
(at 18 cents per bushel for corn and for wheat) could be 
used. 
Direct payments might work better than price sup-
ports above long-run market levels, for two reasons: 
1. They would not reduce consumption, since prices 
would seek their own levels in the market place. 
2. They would have less stimulating effect qn pro-
duction, if they were limited, as the 1963 direct payments 
are, to base quantities. If the payments were thus limited 
to base quantities, farmers would get the benefit of in-
creased returns (prices plus payments) on their base 
quantities, but the lower open-market prices on quanti-
ties in excess of their base would be marginal prices 
which would offer less inducement to increase produc-
tion than the prices plus payments for the base quantities. 
Thus, a mandatory program (1) would cost sub-
stantially less than a voluntary program. (2) It would 
share the burdens and benefits of the program more 
equally among producers, and (3) it could make good 
use of direct payments limited to base quantities. 
One of the offsetting features of the plan is its in-
flexibility. It would compel all producers of the crop 
concerned to cut their acreage by the same percentage. 
This would impose a rigidity on the cropping pattern 
that would be ill adapted to the continuous changes that 
require each individual farmer to make the adjustments 
on his particular farm that suits that farm best. 
The big question about the plan is whether farmers, 
who prize freedom highly, want to subject themselves to 
the "regimentation" involved. This is basically a ques-
tion of values, which are discussed in a later section. 
Governmental Purchase of Land 
Another method of reducing the input of land in 
agriculture would be for the government to purchase 
land and take it out of crop production rather than rent-
ing it out of production as under the Conservation Re-
serve, feed grains, wheat and other crop programs. Gov-
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ernmental purchase rather than rental has some interest-
ing features that are worth investigating," to show what 
the administrative problems, the effects, and the costs 
might be. 
Earl Heady has estimated that if the $8.1 billion 
loss on operations of the CCC from 1933 to 1960 h~d 
been used to buy land at $100 per acre, 81 million acres 
could have been purchased. 1 a The $213 billion of price 
support and conservation expenditures would have bought 
213 million acres at $100 per acre, or half that many 
acres at $200 per acre. If this land had been held out of 
production, this would have solved the farm surplus 
capacity problem, and the government could recoup most 
or all of its costs by selling the land later for other uses. 
In that case, the annual cost would be only the com-
paratively small annual interest charges until the land 
was sold. 
A government purchase program would necessarily 
be a long-run program, because of the permanent nature 
of the purchase operation. It should, therefore, be in line 
with the nation's long-run objectives of economic devel-
opment and efficiency. What kind of purchase program 
would this be? 
One answer might be-a program that would retire 
the poorest land-the least productive (low-yield) land 
in the physical sense. If this basis were chosen, a lot of 
the dry land in the Western Plains would be retired. 
But this program would not necessarily make eco-
nomic sense. The land might be yielding a net return of 
only $5 per acre. But if one farm family could handle 
2,000 acres, the family would be making a good living, 
which would be cut off by government purchase and re-
tirement of the land. 
A manufacturer with many plants who needed to 
retrench might consider closing down the least efficient 
ones. But this would not necessarily be th~ best course 
for him to follow. The least efficient plants might have 
no alternative uses, whereas some of the more efficient 
ones might be easily convertible to other uses. The guid-
ing principle, therefore, would be to close down the 
plants which could be converted to other uses with the 
least reduction in net income to the company as a whole. 
Thus, the land to be retired would not simply be 
the least productive land; the net returns from its alter-
native (non-agricultural) use might be zero. Again we 
can use dry land in the Western Plains, yielding a net 
return of $5 per acre, as an example. Its alternative (non-
agricultural) use might be zero. But land in the South-
east yielding $8 per acre might yield $3 per acre in for-
est, or in use for recreational purposes. The nation would 
be better off to retire this land in the Southeast from 
crop production and put it into trees than to retire the 
dry land in the West and put it to no use at all. 
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Thus, the land to be retired would be, not neces-
sarily the poorest land, but rather the land where the al-
ternative (non-agricultural) use would bring a return 
most nearly equal to its present return, whether that re-
turn be high or low. This land would as likely be in one 
place as in another, in one value bracket as another, and 
in one yield bracket as another. 
The government purchase program that would re-
duce crop production with the least idling of productive 
resources, therefore, would be one that not merely took 
land out, but took it out and put it into non-agricultural 
uses that were the closest possible to full agricultural use 
of the land. The measure of fullness of use in this case 
would be net return. 
If for example, the government purchased land and 
only let it lie idle, then the least idling of resources 
would be attained by idling poor land. But if the pur-
chased land could be put to productive non-agricultural 
use, still less idling of resources might be attained by 
buying good land and putting it to a non-agricultural 
but still almost as highly productive alternative use. 
What might some of these alternative uses be? 
Alternative Uses for Land. In some areas, one al-
ternative use might be sites for homes. This represents 
an intensive use, more valuable in most cases than use 
for crops. But it is very small in percentage terms, and 
not much can be done in any case to expand it. 
Another use is forestry. Particularly in some areas 
in the Southeast, it offers a fairly close alternative to crop 
production. It is well suited to government land, since it 
is a long-range undertaking, whereas private industry is 
usually more interested in quick returns. 
Another use is recreation. As population increases, 
income rises , and more people have more income and 
vacation time to spend, the demand for space for recrea-
tion increases rapidly. It offers a fairly good alternative 
to crop production, in or close to areas of heavy popula-
tion. The 1962 Food and Agriculture Act provided a 
cropland adjustment pilot program for converting farm-
land into recreational uses. This points a direction in 
which much progress might be made. 
One difficulty with these alternatives is that they 
would require careful governmental selection of the areas 
to be purchased, and careful governmental management 
and operation in the non-agricultural uses of the areas 
afterward. This would be an enormous administrative 
undertaking, running against the long tradition in the 
United States of getting land out of government hands 
and into private hands. At best, it would take years to 
get it going on any very large scale. 
Alternatively, the program might be managed, not 
as a program directed from Washington, but as an ad-
junct to the RAD program. The initiative in this case 
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would come from the local areas as they developed their 
programs. To the extent that these programs included 
the diversion of some land from agricultural to non-agri-
cultural uses, Federal funds could be used to finance the 
purchase and development of the land. But so far, the 
RAD programs have not included much planning of 
this sort, and only small effects could be expected from 
it at an early date. 
A more likely approach would be for the govern-
ment to offer a land purchase program only one step re-
moved from the Conservation Reserve rental program, 
which has proved to be administratively feasible. That 
one step would consist of offering to rent the land or 
purchase it, whichever the participant preferred. 
If that were done, it seems likely that the purchase 
prices would need to bear a fairly close relation to the 
rental rates area by area and farm by farm. The simplest 
plan would be to keep these rental rates close to the rates 
in the present Conservation Reserve program. If this 
were done, mostly poor land would be purchased, much 
as mostly poor land has been rented under the Conserva-
tion Reserve program. 
This would be the simplest plan, because the govern-
ment could more easily let its purchases of poor land lie 
idle, or be used only for extensive grazing, than its pur-
chases of good land. Zero use, or grazing, would be a 
much closer alternative to cropping, on poor land than 
on good land. There would be less waste of resources 
than if good Illinois or Iowa land were purchased and 
kept idle by the government, and less pressure for the 
government to put its idle land into some non-agricul-
tural use. 
Estimated Effects and Costs. The costs of a govern-
mental land purchase program clearly would be high, up 
in the billions. To buy something costs several times as 
much as to pay a year's rent for it. 
Yet it may not cost much more to buy a farm than 
to rent it for 10 years (many of the farms in the Co·n-
servation Reserve were rented for 10 years) . And offset-
ting the cost of buying something is the value of the 
thing purchased. In accounting terms, a liquid asset 
(money) is exchanged for a fixed asset (in this case, land) 
with no effect on the total assets. 
A man who buys a house ordinarily takes out a 
mortgage, a form of bond, ro cover most of the value of 
the house. Similarly, the government could pay for the 
land by issuing land bonds. These bonds would represent, 
not particular farms but the value of the land in the 
whole purchase program. Then with the passage of time, 
the government would sell parts of its land for recreation, 
for forests, and other nonfarm uses , as occasion arose, 
and retire part of the bonds. 
One disadvantage of a land purchase program is the 
slow rate at which it would proceed. Only about 11 mil-
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lion acres come on the market for voluntary sales or 
transfers per year. The government would need to pro-
ceed slowly-not necessarily at a small percentage of this 
11 million acres, because the government purchases would 
be a different element and would in most cases be 
focused on different land from that which ordinarily 
comes on the market-but still slowly, so as not to drive 
up the price of land unduly. To use a rough figure for 
illustration, say 5 million acres of purchases per year, 
that would take 12 years before 60 million acres were 
purchased. 
Easements 
Another method of taking land out of agricultural 
production would be for the government to rent land, 
not out of agricultural production completely as under 
the feed grains and wheat programs, but only out of the 
production of certain specified crops, for a specified period 
of time. 
"Easement provisions probably could be more easily 
and effectively enforced chan zoning regulations and 
might be more acceptable to local residents, but certainly 
that would be more expensive to the government. The 
two procedures are, in large measure, alternative methods 
of achieving similar objectives, and their relative merits 
need further exploration. Where good lands are inter-
spersed with submarginal lands, the purchase of perman-
ent easements would permit of releasing such lands for 
seated periods in time of need and thus would probably 
provide more positive control and greater flexibility than 
zoning. Furthermore, chis could be a Federal program, 
whereas zoning ordinances are local and subject to many 
uncertainties both as to adoption and enforcement." 41 
Another form of easement would be to rent crop-
land out of crop production but let it be used for grazing. 
This would avoid idling cropland completely ; it would 
merely put the land to a lower agricultural use, for the 
production chiefly of beef, a product for which the de-
mand is steadily expanding. This would be an attractive 
proposition in many parts of the Great Plains, where a 
good deal of cropland is really marginal or submarginal 
for crops but would make good grazing land. 
KINDS OF PROGRAMS FOR DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES 
Economic theory and actual experience both indicate 
the different kinds of land retirement programs that are 
best adapted to achieve different specified goals. 
The Short-Run Goal of Reducing Surplus Stocks. 
To make.-the exposition as clear as possible, we will 
use some analogies with industry, using them for illustra-
tion only and not for proof. 
If General Motors, for instance, found itself with a 
short-term accumulation of stocks of unsold cars, it could 
41
"The Wheat Problem: Which Road Shall We Take?" 
A statement by the NP A Agricultural Committee and a re-
attain the short-run goal of reducing the stocks by re-
ducing production (if union contracts permitted) by (a) 
laying off all its workers and stopping production com-
pletely for a short time, (b) laying off its least efficient 
workers but keeping the rest producing, or (c) putting 
everybody on a shorter work week. 
The third method, putting all its workers on a short-
er work week, would create the lease personal upheaval 
among most of the workers. 
Agriculture in its present situation, where its highest 
priority objective is to reduce its surplus stocks, is at-
tacking the problem by retiring land under the feed 
grains and wheat programs in a manner that is analogous 
to the third method in industry-putting all its workers 
on a shorter work week. This creates less disturbance 
than laying off some farmers completely, as in effect the 
Conservation Reserve did, if those farmers are likely to 
be needed back in agricultural production again in a few 
years. 
A program of this sort aims to cake out about the 
same percentage of good, medium and poor land, as the 
feed grains programs did. This spreads the reduction 
relatively evenly over the country. 
If agriculture were run from the top like General 
Motors , it could order a uniform reduction of say 15 
percent in acres on all the producers of the specific crop 
concerned. Since agriculture is not run like General 
Motors, it has proceeded with feed grains and wheat pro-
grams of a voluntary nature, inducing participation by 
commodity loans above open-market prices, by rental 
payments, and so on. The preceding section has shown 
how using mandatory methods, mandatory on all pro-
ducers of the crop concerned, could reduce the money 
costs of the program and improve effectiveness. But the 
fact that mandatory controls were defeated (though only 
by a narrow margin) in 1962, indicates that they run 
counter to some deeply held values of a free-enterprise 
nature, while running along with other values of an 
equity nature. 
The Long-Run Goals of Efficiency and Economic 
Development. 
The program outlined in the preceding section is 
suitable for attaining the short-term goal of reducing 
stocks, but it conflicts with long-run goals of efficiency 
and full economic development for the country as a 
whole. 
The agricultural problem is regarded by many as a 
chronic tendency for production to outrun demand at 
acceptable prices. If General Motors were confronted by 
a chronic problem of that sort with its automobiles, it 
would not attempt to solve it by going to a shorter work 
week. Rather it would survey all its plants and workers, 
and begin to convert as many of its plants as possible to 
port by Murray R. Benedict. Planning Pamphlet No. 118. 
pp. 18-19, August, 1962. 
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the production of other products, and to close down its 
least efficient plants which could not be converted. It 
would retrain some of its workers for other lines in its 
plants , and lay off the least efficient workers which it 
could not retrain, abandoning them to unemployment 
insurance or to government retraining programs. 
In agriculture, where there is a chronic tendency for 
production to outstrip demand, the Conservation Reserve 
type of programs, permitting the taking out of whole 
farms, would be best adapted to this kind of situation. 
The Conservation Reserve program is analogous to con-
verting whole plants-whole farms in the case of agri-
culture-to the production of other products, or closing 
them down completely. 
This kind of program would not need to have rental 
rates set relatively high for poor land, as they were in 
the Conservation Reserve, so as to take out mostly poor 
land. The kind of land that needs to be taken out of agri-
cultural production, from the long-run point of view, is 
that which can be most easily (with the least loss of 
revenue) be converted to another use. This other use in 
some cases will be recreation; in other, country home 
building sites; in others, forest, and so on. It is only 
when there is no alternative use other than idleness that 
it is most efficient to take out the poorest land. 
B. CAPITAL 
Capital is a large input in agriculture, and it has 
been growing larger with the passage of time. 
Table 1 and figure 3 earlier in this report show the 
changes that have been taking place. They show that 
the value of the capital input in agriculture had grown 
by 1960 to more than half of the value of the total in-
puts in agriculture, offsetting the decline in the inputs of 
the other two factors-land and labor. Land has declined 
moderately, and labor has declined substantially, from 
nearly two-thirds of the total inputs in 1870 to less than 
one-third in 1958. 
The value of the input of capital is now greater than 
the value of the inputs of the other two products com-
bined. On this basis, it is a likely factor to consider in an 
attempt to limit agricultural production by limiting in-
puts. 
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN 
UNITED STATES AGRICULTURE. 
Capital inputs in agriculture may be divided into 
two major groups (1) capital investment, and (2 ) operat-
ing expenses (exclusive of labor) . Capital investment, ex-
clusive of the investment in land, amounted to more than 
10 percent of total farm inputs in 1960. 
Table 12 shows capital investment in agriculture an-
nually since 1950. It shows that roughly a third of the 
capital expenditures goes for each one of three main 
items. These are (1) buildings, (2) tractors , trucks, and 
automobiles, and (3) other machinery and equipment. 
These items totaled more than $4 billion in 1961. 
These are all items of capital investment in agricul-
ture. Their relation to production depends heavily upon 
the length of time involved. If this investment were 
curbed, some time would elapse before this curbing 
would have any substantial effect on production. More 
repairs would be made to carry the old buildings .and 
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machinery along; the old tractor would run another year 
or two, and so on. In order for control of capital to be 
effective quickly, repairs would need to be controlled, too. 
AMOUNT OF CURRENT FARM OPERATING 
EXPENSES. 
The second kind of capital expenditure is current 
farm operating expenses. Exclusive of hired labor, these 
totaled over $16 billion in 1960. The data for the years 
since 1950 are given in table 13. 
Feed and Livestock Purchased 
The first and largest of these items is feed purchased. 
It amounted to $4.8 billion in 1961. This input for live-
stock feeders to a large extent is an output for grain pro-
ducers. It has been subjected to some degree of control 
by the loan and storage operations of the CCC, and by 
the 1961 and 1962 emergency feed grain programs. 
Livestock purchased is the third largest operating ex-
pense; it was $2 .5 billion in 1961. This also is a farm 
output item for many farms and ranches. It has been sub-
jected only indirectly to control, through the effects on 
feeder prices of the federal grain programs. 
The USDA exercises a good deal of control over 
feed available, and thus over livestock purchased for feed-
ing, through its CCC commodity loan and storage opera-
tions. Most of the immense stocks of feed grains that the 
CCC now owns would otherwise have been fed to live-
stock. But storage is only a temporary control measure; 
the CCC cannot go on accumulating stocks and with-
holding them from livestock feeding indefinitely, and 
when it does return them to feeding, the stocks will add 
to the then current supplies. 
The acreage control programs, at least the emergency 
1961 and 1962 feed grain programs, have had some effect 
in reducing production. They are expensive, and their 
t  r ti  f t r r t ,  t  l   it  
l t ffi i t l t  i  l  t  rt . It 
l  r tr i   f it  r r  f r t r li  i  it  
l ts,  lay  t  l t ffi i t r r  i  it 
l  t t i , i  t  t  l t 
i   t  t t i i  . 
 i lt ,  t  i   i  t   
   ,    
t   ,  
, 
 
ti  
lt r -t  t  r ti  f t r r t , r l i  
t   l t l . 
i  i  f r r  l  t  t   r t l 
r t  t r l ti l  i  f r r l ,  t  r  i  
t  ti  ,   t  t  t tl   
l .  i   l  t t  t   t  t  i
lt l ti ,  t  l  i t  i , i  
t t i    t il    l t l   
     .    i  
      ,   
 l  
 t 
 
 
  
 
t   
   
t  i  
t  t  
l  
t  
 
t   
i . 
tt  
t . 
I  
t   
i  
l i   
  
  
ll  
it  
it .    ,  , ,  
t ,      . 
 it  t t l   t   illi  i  . 
  ll it   it l i t t i  i l
t . i  l ti  t  ti   il   
t  l t   ti  i l . t i  i t t  
r ,  ti  l  l  f r  t i  r i  
l    t ti l ff t  r ti . r  
r ir  l    t  rr  t  l  il i  ,  
 
 r 
O    
, . 
 t 
,  
  
 li
 
t l 
,   
. 
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
  t  
         li
.   i  l   t   ; 
t   t   l ti  t   it
l i  t   li t  i  i ,  
 it  t  t  t  i , t  t  ill  
t  t  t  t li . 
 r  tr l r r , t l t t  r  
   f  r i  r r ,    ff t 
i  r i  r ti .  r  i ,  t ir 
TABLE 12-FARM CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND NET INVESTMENT, 1950-60 
Gross capital expenditures on: 
Buildings Motor vehicles 
Service Other Total net 
Farm buildings machinery investment 
operators' and other and All in farm plant 
Year dwellings structuresb Total Tractors Trucks Automobilesc Total equiJ2mentd items and equipmente 
Million Million Million Million Million Million Million Million Million Million 
dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars 
1950 739 841 1,580 769 520 446 1, 735 1,279 4, 594 1,858 
1951 '788 897 1,685 807 481 469 1,757 1,383 4,825 1,599 
1952 885 1,008 1,893 755 396 284 1 , 435 1,368 4, 696 1,297 
1953 848 965 1,813 722 437 588 1, 747 1, 225 4,785 1, 265 
1954 788 896 1,684 570 452 404 1, 426 1,120 4,230 614 
1955 766 872 1,638 689 406 397 1, 492 1,099 4,229 507 
1956 740 842 1,582 525 432 326 1,283 998 3, 863 141 
1957 737 840 1,577 522 488 392 1, 402 976 3,955 70 
1958 700 796 1,496 677 500 443 1,620 1,328 4, 444 496 
1959 747 879 1 , 626 763 505 387 1,655 1,348 4,629 494 
1960 767 841 1 , 608 496 486 379 1,361 1,178 4,147 3 
~Includes new construction, additions, and major improvements. 
Includes fences, windmills, wells, and dwellings not occupied by the farm operators. 
cFor farm business use (40 percent of total farm purchases of automobiles). 
dExcludes harness and saddlery and other minor types of equipment charged to current expense in the "miscellaneous" 
category of table 14H. 
eGross capital expenditures on all items minus total depreciation and other capital consumption. 
Source: The Farm Income Situation, Economic Research Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, FIS-183 July 1961, p. 49. 
TABLE 13-CURRENT FARM OPERATING EXPENSES, 1950-60 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
Feed 
purchased 
Million 
~ 
3,283 
4,144 
4,331 
3,770 
3,906 
3,840 
4,058 
4,083 
4,592 
4, 808 
4,848 
Livestock 
purchased 
Million 
!Ml..al.:§ 
2,004 
2, 437 
1,917 
1, 320 
1,563 
1,530 
1, 629 
1,957 
2, 711 
2, 723 
2,508 
aincludes bulbs, plants and trees. 
bFrom table 16H. 
Seed 
purchased a 
Million 
~ 
531 
561 
594 
560 
542 
577 
537 
529 
526 
506 
538 
Repairs and 
Fertilizer operation of Miscel-
and lime capital itemsb laneousc 
Million Million Million 
~ dollars dollars 
978 2,921 1,750 
1,085 3,187 2,079 
1,229 3,433 2,117 
1,245 3,435 2,100 
1,274 3,353 2, 076 
1,256 3,423 2,167 
1,241 3,617 2,303 
1,280 3, 773 2,286 
1,338 3,795 2,436 
1,460 4,002 2,665 
1,463 3, 986 2,728 
Total 
excluding Hired 
hired labor labord Total 
Million Million Million 
dollars dollars ~ 
11,467 2,678 14,145 
13,493 2,800 16,293 
13,621 2, 802 16,423 
12,430 2,793 15,223 
12,714 2, 716 15 , 430 
12,793 2 , 736 15,529 
13 , 385 2,733 16,118 
13, 908 2,785 16 , 693 
15,398 2 , 895 18,293 
16,164 2,962 19,126 
16,071 2,935 19,006 
Cincludes short-term interest, pesticides, ginning, electricity and telephones (business share), livestock marketing charges, 
containers, milk hauling (1946 to date), irrigation, grazing, binding materials, tolls for sirup, horses and mules, harness 
and saddlery, blacksmithing and hardware, veterinary services and medicines, net insurance premiums (crop, fire, wind 
and hail) and miscellaneous dairy, nursery, greenhouse, apiary, and other supplies. 
dFrom table 15H. 
Source: The Farm Income Situation, ERS, USDA, FIS-183, July 1961, p. 46. 
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future is uncertain; but they constitute one means for 
controlling the supply of livestock, particularly hogs, 
which depend largely on feed grains. 
Fertilizer 
One of the most directly output-increasing capital 
inputs is fertilizer. The rapid increase in the quantity of 
fertilizer since 1944, together with the increase in plant 
nutrients per ton, is shown in the earlier section on land 
in table 6. The number of acres fertilized, and the per-
centage of each crop acreage, as shown herewith in table 
14. Table 15 presents similar data for the State of Iowa 
for 1960. Figure 15 illustrates regional and national trends 
in use of commercial fertilizers, 1940-1959. 
Increased applications of fertilizer have been one of 
the chief causes of the increase in agricultural production 
in recent years. It is estimated that if no fertilizer had 
been used, the tOtal production of crops, hay and pasture 
in 1954 would have been 30 percent less than it actually 
was.42 Accordingly, a reduction in fertilizer use of about 
one-third would have been about enough to eliminate 
excess production, estimated at about 8 percent. 43 
One of the main reasons why the use of fertilizer has 
increased so rapidly is that the price of fertilizer has risen 
less than the prices received by farmers for the products 
they sell. Fertilizer prices have declined relative to the 
prices received by farmers. Table 16 shows the index of 
the price of fertilizer since 1944 and the index of prices 
received by farmers. Table 6 earlier showed how the plant-
nutrient content of these fertilizers has increased since 
"'
2 D. B. Iba<;:h and R. C. Lindberg, "The Economic Posi-
tion of Fertilizer Use in the United States," USDA, ARS, 
Ag. Inf. Bul. No. 202. November 1958. 
43 The reduction in fertilizer would need to be propor-
tionately greater than the reduction in production tO be ex-
pected, because the application of fertilizer encounters di-
minishing returns. 
TABLE 14-USE OF FERTILIZER ON CROPS AND PASTURE, 1954a 
Plant nutrients used 
Percentage 
of harvested Rate 
Acreage acreage per acre 
Cro12 fertilized fertilized Total fertilized 
1, 000 acres Percent 1, 000 tons Pounds 
Corn 46,873 60 1,888 80 
Cotton 10, 948 58 572 105 
Tobacco 1,515 97 226 298 
Sugar beets 776 92 49 127 
Sugar cane 299 96 14 92 
Soybeans 3,075 18 102 69 
Dry beans 838 54 23 58 
Peanuts 1, 001 62 43 86 
Potatoes and sweetpotatoes 1,144 78 171 299 
Vegetables 3, 642 63 381 209 
Fruits 2,422 58 182 151 
Grain sorghums 2,719 27 54 40 
Intertilled crops 75,252 51 3,705 98 
Wheat 14,034 28 452 64 
Oats 11, 559 31 402 71 
Barley 3,222 27 82 52 
Rye 322 25 12 76 
Rice 2 055 84 59 64 
Close- growing crops 31,192 28 1, 007 65 
Hay and pastureb 18,235 11 748 82 
All cro12s and 12asture 124,679 30 5,460 88 
aBased on census data supplemented by estimates made by State committees. Crops included account for about 98 . 5 percent 
of all fertilizer used on farms in 1954 . 
blncludes hay and rotation pasture in all regions and permanent pasture in the humid regions. 
Source of table: Ibach and Lindberg, op. cit., p . 8. 
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TABLE 15-ESTIMATED USE OF PRINCIPAL PLANT NUTRlENTS, BY CROPS, STATE OF IOWA, 1960a 
Percentage of 
Acreage harvested acreage Plant nutrients used 
fertilized fertilized Totals Rate- Acre 
CroE (acres) (Eercent) (tons) (pounds~ 
1. Corn 6,356,049 51 251 ,336 GO 
2 . Wheat 47,526 29 776 40 
3 . Soybeans 72,673 3 530 15 
4. Hay and cropland pasture 325,023 5 11 ' 107 so 
5. Other crops-totals 567,828 13 13 ,443 21 
a. Sorghum 31,700 35 850 57 
b. Oats 450,790 10.7 11, 508 54 
c . Barley 2,778 10 70 58 
d. Rye 890 10 23 58 
e . Flax 1,172 10 16 26 
f. Potatoes 2, 946 100 146 84 
0' 
o• Sweet Potatoes 395 100 30 160 
h. Popcorn 5,345 35 47 20 
i. Vegetables for sale 19,363 100 213 42 
j. Vegetables for home use 40,845 75 326 21 
k. Small fruits 0 0 0 0 
I. Tree fruits 2, 1 71 25 11 10 
m. Nursery-green house 6,609 100 125 51 
n . Miscellaneous, tmspecified 2, 791 50 39 30 
6. Items 1 to 5, include 7,374,099 29 277,192 75 
7. Permanent open pasture 45,678 1 
a. Improved permanent 
open pasture 45,678 13 684 30 
8 . Totals (items 6 and 7). 7,419,777 25 277,876 75 
asource: Data collected and provided by Agronomy Department, Iowa State University, October 1962. 
TABLE 16-INDEXES OF PRICES PAID FOR FERTILIZER 
AND OF PRICES RECEIVED BY FARMERS, 
1944-1961 
(Base Period 1910-1914 = 100) 
Prices paid Prices received 
for fertilizer by farmers 
1 944 118 197 
1945 120 207 
1946 121 236 
1947 1 34 276 
1948 146 287 
1949 150 250 
1950 144 258 
1951 152 302 
1952 1 56 288 
1953 157 255 
1954 158 246 
1955 155 232 
1956 152 230 
1957 153 235 
1958 1 53 250 
1 959 152 240 
1960 152 238 
1961 154 240 
Source: Agricultural Statistics, 1961 U. S. Department of 
Agriculture, pp . 474, 475. 
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1944. It showed that the percent of phosphoric oxide in 
all fertilizers has remained almost constant, but that the 
percent of the other nutrients has risen 50 percent for 
some and more than 100 percent for others. It is evident 
from these tables that fertilizer prices per ton of plant 
nutrient have declined substantially relative to the prices 
that farmers receive for their products , since 1944. The 
ARS, USDA, estimates that the average cost of fertilizer 
per unit of plant nutrients declined from about $2.02 in 
1945 to $1.92 in 1961; this is a decline of 5 percent. 
Meanwhile the index of prices received by farmers rose 
13 percent. Thus the price of fertilizer declined, relatively, 
18 percent. 
This suggests that one way to reduce the use of fer-
tilizer would be to raise its price. This increase in price, 
however, would have to be quite substantial. The mar-
ginal return per dollar of fertilizer input in 1954 averaged 
nearly $3.00. 44 On that basis, for most crops, the price of 
fertilizer would need to be more than doubled before its 
use would become uneconomic. 
More fertilizer is being applied now than in 1954, so 
the marginal return now, probably, is not so high as it 
was in 1954. If the price of fertilizer rose, say 50 percent, 
44lbach and Lindberg, op. cit. 
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Fig. 1 5-Fertilizer Consumption in the U. S. by Regions, 1949-50. 
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and if farmers found that this made its use uneconomic 
at the margin, the use of fertilizer would decline, and 
crop production would decline along with it. This reduc-
tion in application of fertilizer would reduce agricultural 
production directly and quickly. 
A Tax on Fertilizer 
One of the simplest ways to raise the price of fer-
tilizer would be to put a tax on it. 
If the demand for fertilizer were completely inelastic 
-completely unresponsive to changes in price-the tax 
would all be passed on to farmers . That is, farmers would 
pay the price plus the tax, and use as much fertilizer as 
before. Production would therefore continue as great as 
ever. 
At the other extreme, if the supply of fertilizer were 
completely inelastic, the tax would all be absorbed by 
the fertilizer manufacturers. In this case, also, fertilizer 
production and use would continue as great as before. 
These, of course, are unrealistic "ifs", brought in 
here only for clarity, to establish two bench marks, two 
extremes. It seems likely that the truth lies between 
these limiting cases-between the two extremes; prob-
ably, the demand for and the supply of fertilizer both 
have considerable elasticity. In this sit~ation, the pro-
duction and consumption of fertilizer would decline, and 
the burden of the tax would be divided between the fer-
tilizer producer and the consumer, inversely in propor-
tion to the relative elasticity of the supply and the de-
mand. 
Under these conditions, a stiff tax on fertilizer would 
reduce production. But the application of a tax of this 
sort would undoubtedly run into political difficulties. A 
tax that was heavy enough to reduce fertilizer consump-
tion and therefore, production substantially would be 
strongly opposed by the fertilizer companies. Farmers al-
so would object; each farmer would fear that his profits 
would decline along with his declining use of fertilizer. 
The fertilizer tax plan could reduce agricultural produc-
tion, but it probably would run into severe political ob-
jections, which we as economists do not know how to 
solve. 
Table 17 shows that if no fertilizer had been applied 
in 1954, the estimated total cost per bushel of producing 
corn in the Corn Belt in 1954 would have been $1.18 per 
bushel. With fertilizer applied at the rate actually used 
TABLE 17-ESTIMATED YIELDS AND COSTS PER ACRE AND PER UNIT, WITH NO FERTILIZER, AND WITH 
FERTILIZER APPLIED AT 1954 RATES AND AT RATES CALCULATED TO RESULT IN MINIMUM 
TJNIT COSTS, FOR SELECTED CROPS AND REGIONS 
Rate of plant 
nutrients per Estimated yield Estimated total cost Estimated total cost 
a per acreb per unit of yieldc acre per acre 
At rate At rate At rate 
For At rate for At rate for At rate for 
minimum With no applied minimum With no applied minimum With no applied minimum 
unit ferti- in unit ferti- in unit ferti- in unit 
Cro:e and region 1954 costa lizer 1 954 cost lizer 1954 cost lizer 1954 cost 
Pounds Pounds Bushels Bushels Bushels Dollars Dollars Dollars Dollars Dollars Dollars 
Corn: 
Corn Belt 86 265 34.4 60.2 101 .8 40.48 49.68 70.66 1.18 0.83 0.69 
Mississippi Delta 85 260 9.3 27.2 50.1 38.05 47.64 67-35 4.09 1. 75 1. 34 
Oats : 
Corn Belt 83 137 32.3 67.5 84.3 20 .85 30.18 36.21 .65 .45 .43 
Appalachian 89 220 11.1 45.8 81.7 19.66 31.32 47.76 1. 77 .68 .58 
Wheat 
Corn Belt 78 213 10.3 32 . 2 57.4 37.33 46.95 63.77 3.62 1. 46 1.10 
Soybeans: 
Mississippi Delta 25 150 14.1 17.2 29.2 28.59 31.29 44.87 2.03 1. 82 1.54 
Hay Tons Tons Tons 
Corn Belt 80 235 1. 36 3.54 7.46 25.11 36.14 60.07 18.46 10.22 8.05 
MississiJ2J2i Delta 50 178 .88 2 . 33 4. 93 28.04 35.15 52.82 31 .86 15.09 10.71 
aBased on generalized estimates of response to different rates of fertilizer. 
bAll costs except fertilizer based on surveys undertaken to characterize rann organization, ' income, and costs on type-size 
farms in different areas. 
ccosts per acre divided by yield per acre. 
Source of table: Ibach and Lindberg, op. cit., p. 20. 
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in 1954, the cost would have been only 83 cents. Higher 
rates of application would reduce the cost to a minimum 
of 69 cents. Costs in the Mississippi Delta would have 
been reduced from $4.09 to $1.34. 45 
The reductions in cost of production for other crops 
are similarly great. They range up to two-thirds in some 
cases. Figure 16 illustrates the extent to which use of fer-
tilizer might profitably be carried in planning for highest 
net return per acre. 
45 Estimates of yields, production, acreage-fertilizer and 
minimum cost combinations for indicated production levels 
are based partly on estimates of response to fertilizer con-
rained in U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Handbook No. 68, Fertilizer 
Use and Crop Yields in the United States, December 1954. 
Estimates of response assume average weather and some 
Accordingly, a program to reduce the use of ferti-
lizer, if it succeeded, would be very uneconomic. It would 
increase the cost of producing corn, for example, sub-
stantially. This is not the direction in which economic 
progress lies. 
Machinery and Repairs 
The problems involved in controlling the purchase 
and use of farm machinery, and repairs to keep it opera-
improvement in other practices. These estimates are prelimi-
nary; they are subject to revision pending availabili ty of more 
complete information on yield response. 
We are endeavoring ro develop relationships of this 
nature on the basis of more recent data, so far, without suc-
cess. 
Fig. 16-Fertilizer Use and Unit Cost-Selected Regions. 
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rive, are similar to those for controlling the use of ferti-
lizer. 
A tax on farm machinery and repairs would be high-
ly unpopular with farm machinery manufacturers and 
with farmers as well. Manufacturers would resist anything 
that would reduce their sales, and most farmers feel that 
farm machinery prices are already too high. 
Gasoline and Diesel Fuel 
The problems involved in controlling the use of 
gasoline and diesel fuel differ in one important respect 
from those involved with fertilizer and machinery. 
Gasoline and diesel fuel for use in tracto.rs on farms 
and ranches at present is exempt from the tax that is ap-
plied to gasoline sold at regular filling stations. If, there-
fore, a program of reducing the capital inputs into agri-
culture were extended to motor fuel used in agricultural 
production, the program would not need to be imple-
mented by imposing a tax on the motor fuel; it could 
be implemented simply by removing the existing tax 
exemption. 
The removal of the existing tax exemption on trac-
tor fuel would undoubtedly be strongly opposed by farm-
ers and ranchers. It might get some support from other 
business or manufacturing groups who use fuel in their 
business operations, but it is problematical whether this 
support would be great enough to overcome the resist-
ance of farm groups. In any case, the farm demand for 
tractor fuel probably is so inelastic that removing the tax 
exemption would not have much effect on production. It 
would not do much more than rouse farmers' ire. 
EFFECTS OF REDUCING THE INPUT OF CAPITAL 
ON ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. 
The preceding discussion has pointed out the per-
sonal and political problems involved in reducing the in-
put of capital into agriculture. The purpose of the pres-
ent section is to outline the economic effects if these 
problems were solved and the inputs of capital were sub-
stantially reduced. 
It is apparent on the face of it that in one important 
respect, reducing the input of capital would be similar to 
reducing the input of land. Even if reducing the input of 
capital were not offset by an increased input of other 
factors, and it did reduce agricultural production, it would 
do so in a way that would conflict with long-run goals 
of efficiency in agriculture. 
Capital is mobile; or more accurately, the flow of 
new capital is mobile, so that it tends to flow wherever 
the return to capital is the highest. Reducing the flow of 
capital into agriculture would make capital in agriculture 
relatively scarce, and this would increase the return on 
the capital in agriculture above its present levels. This in 
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turn would make the problem of reducing the flow of 
capital into agriculture more difficult; it would increase 
the pull on capital to flow into agriculture. 
In concrete terms : If capital had been earning a mar-
ginal rate of return of 4 percent in agriculture, and the 
flow of capital into agriculture were reduced so that the 
marginal rate of return in agriculture rose to 5 percent, 
that would make it more attractive for capital to flow in-
to agriculture; correspondingly, that would make it more 
difficult to reduce the flow. 
This would be similar to the present situation with 
land, where the reduction in the input of land into agri-
culture is one of the things that has raised the price of 
land 83 percent over the past 12 years and made it more 
expensive and difficult to keep it out of agricultural pro-
duction. 
The effects on production efficiency in both cases 
are serious. 
Reducing the input of capital into agriculture would 
be a step backward, coward the hand plow, the hoe, and 
the flail. More labor would be required in agriculture, 
since the physical productivity per man would be re-
duced. It is an open question whether the depressing ef-
fect of the low physical productivity on farm incomes 
would be offset by the higher prices that would result if 
the program were successful in reducing production. If 
it were not, then the program would conflict with the 
chief goal in agriculture-to increase income per farmer. 
REDUCE RESEARCH IN PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY. 
Another possibility, which has actually reached the 
form of a proposal in some instances, is to curtail or 
eliminate the investment in farm technological research 
and education. 
"This would mean the elimination of funds for tech-
nological research and education such as those of the 
land-grant universities . Since much of the research is now 
carried on by commercial companies, however, it also 
might be necessary to remove the research expenditures 
of these companies from income tax exemption or tore-
move patent protection involving farm technology. Since 
much educational work also is done privately, it would 
be necessary to establish a tax on farm magazines, radios, 
television, and other sources which disseminate new 
ideas."46 
This would not only be impractical; it would run 
directly counter to the underlying economic policy of the 
46Eber Eldridge, "The Farm Problem ... What are the 
Choices?" No. 8. "Restricting Capital and Technology?" 
Iowa Stare University. 1961. 
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whole country, which is to increase production by the 
application of new research at as high a rate as possible. 
CONFLICT WITH LONG-RUN NATIONAL GOALS. 
Reducing the input of capital into agriculture, there-
by retaining more labor in agriculture, would reduce ef-
ficiency in the rest of the economy as well as in agricul-
ture. 
One of the measures of the standard of living, in a 
closed economy, is the percentage of the people who are 
engaged in agriculture. If most of the population is en-
gaged in agriculture, only a small part of it is free to 
produce the nonfarm products-bathtubs, radios, auto-
mobiles, education, etc. -that make up the standard of 
living. Conversely, the fewer the people in agriculture, 
the more can be producing the other things which to-
gether with food and clothing make up a high standard 
of living. 
It needs to be emphasized that the same thing is 
true, only less obviously, when the input of land is re-
duced. Reducing the input of land also lowers returns to 
farm labor (including management) in agriculture, and 
lowers efficiency in the rest of the economy as well as in 
agriculture. Programs that reduce the input of land in 
agriculture are more feasible than programs to reduce the 
input of capital. Both kinds .of programs, however, reduce 
the efficiency of production in agriculture and in the 
economy as a whole, and therefore conflict with the 
long-run goals of the nation. 
Programs to reduce the input of capital, like pro-
grams to reduce the input of land, would be (or in the 
case of land, are) spectacular and impressive, in the short 
run. But they are both like a habit-forming drug that 
only covers up the real disease, and adds the problem of 
getting off the drug to the problem of the fundamental 
disease, which runs on unchecked or is made worse by 
the drug. 
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There is no reason to believe that even if the in-
puts of land or capital, or both, could be controlled, that 
this would solve the farm problem. This becomes clear 
if we look at the problem analytically, in terms of eco-
nomic principles. 
Prices are the results of supply and demand. They are 
the evidence or symptoms of a disease of supply or de-
mand or both. When prices are deemed unsatisfactory (a 
"problem") the reasons for this problem lie in the rela-
tionship between the supply and the demand. The price 
program set up to implement the price policy deals with 
the results or effects of supply or demand, not with the 
supply or demand itself. The price program may tem-
porarily alleviate the symptoms, but it makes the causa-
tive supply or demand disease worse. 
This disease is not cured even by production-control 
programs to back up the price-support programs. These 
production-control programs may seem to be getting at 
the disease better than price-support programs, because 
they deal with production rather than with prices. But 
even they do not deal with supply (the whole curve); 
they deal only with production (a point on the supply 
curve) leaving the position of the supply curve unaf-
fected. The over-production problem is only pushed back, 
not solved. And the program works against itself; the 
more it pushes production back and raises prices, so that 
production becomes more profitable, the more it has to 
pay farmers not to produce. 
There is a still more basic point. Production-control 
programs deal only with the production of farm products. 
Evidence is accumulating that this is really not the basic 
problem; it is becoming clear that the chief problem is 
not an excessive supply of farm products; it is an exces-
sive supply of some of the factors of production, prin-
cipally farm labor and management. 
This evidence is somewhat complicated and diverse. 
It is presented in the next section, or labor. 
hole country, hich is to increase production by the 
application of ne  research at as high a rate as possible. 
I  I  -  I  . 
e ci  t e i t f ca ital i t  a ric lt re, t ere-
 retai i  re la r i  a ric lt re, l  re ce ef-
fi i  i  t  r st f t   as ll s i  ri l-
t r . 
 f t  r  f t  t r  f li i , i   
cl s  , i  t  r t  f t  l   r  
e  i  ri lture. I t f t  l ti  i  -
 i  ri lt , l   ll t  it i   t  
r  t   t t t , i , t
il s, ti , t .   t  t   
li i . r ly, t      , 
t     
t r it  f   
f li i . 
It  t   
tr , l  l  i l , 
. i  t  i  
f r  l r (i l i  
l rs ffi i  i  t  
a ri lt r . r  
a ri lt r  r   
i t f it l. t  i
t  ffi i   
e    l ,  
l -r  l   t  
r r  t   
r s t  r  t  i
cas  f l , r  t
r . t t   t  
l  r   t  l 
tti  ff t   t  
is s , i  r   
t  r . 
42 
here is no reason to believe that even if the in-
puts of land or capital, or both, c uld be controlled, that 
this ould solve the far  proble . his beco es clear 
if e look at the proble  analytically, in ter s f eco-
ic ri ci les. 
rices are t e res lts f s l  a  e a . e  are 
t  i  r s t s f  is s  f s l  r e-
 r t .  ri s r   s tisf t r  (  
r l ) t  r s s f r t is r l  li  i  t  r l -
ti i  t  t  l   t  .  ri  
r r  t  t  i l t t  ri  li  ls it  
t  lt  r ff t   l  r , t it  t  
l    it l .  i    t -
il  ll i t  t  ptO , t it  t  s -
     . 
   ti - tr l 
t r . s  
  t   tti  t 
t r , s  
  it  ri s. t 
 t  l  r ); 
  i t  t  l  
 l  r  f-
 i  l   , 
 i t it lf; t  
 i  ri , s  t t 
, t  r  it s t  
t. ti - tr l 
ti   f r  r ts. 
  ll  t t  si  
 t  i f r l  is 
 t ; it i   s-
  ti , ri -
. 
li t   i rs . 
,  l r. 
C. LABOR AND MANAGEMENT 
Labor is the next most important input into agricul-
ture after capitaL Table 1 and figure 3 early in this re-
port show that the input of labor (30 percent of total in-
puts) is only about half as high as the input of capital, 
but it is about twice as high as the input of the third 
factor, land. 
Table 1 and figure 3 also show that the input of 
labor in agriculture has been declining rapidly. This is 
shown also directly by the farm population statistics 
in the following table. 
FARM POPULATION, 1940-60 (REVISED) 
Year 1 000 Year 1 , 000 
1940 30,547 1951 21,890 
1941 30,118 1952 21,748 
1942 28,914 1953 19, 874 
1943 26,186 1954 19,019 
1944 24,815 1955 19, 078 
1945 24,420 1956 18, 712 
1946 25,403 1957 17' 656 
1947 25,829 1958 17,128 
1948 24,383 1959 16,592 
1949 24,194 1960 15, 635a 
1950 23 048 
a!ncludes Alaska and Hawaii. 
Source: USDA, "Farm Population, Revised Estimates for 
1941-1959," Economic Research Service, 
Washington, D. C., August 1962, p. 8. 
These farm population data show the decline that 
has been taking place in the demand for farmers, as im-
proved technology such as larger implements, better 
seed, more fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, etc., enable 
farmers to increase their production per man more rapid-
ly than the demand for farm products has increased. 
The number of farmers in the United States now is 
only half as great as the number in 1920. 
Fewer and fewer farmers are needed; yet the farm 
birth rate is higher than the rate required to maintain a 
constant farm population. The supply of farmers con-
tinues to exceed the declining demand for them. A tre-
mendous out-migration of farmers from agriculture and 
into urban jobs has been taking place, but it has not been 
fast enough; farm incomes remain depressed below non-
farm incomes. Farm labor and management is a factor, an 
input, that surely needs to be reduced. 
Early Heady in fact regards the continuous over-
supply of farmers as the chief problem in agriculture. 
"Agriculture's fundamental problem is not supply of pro-
duct but supply or quantity of factors ,"47 chiefly labor 
and management. 
The supply of cropland was reduced by the Conser-
vation Reserve, feed grains, wheat and other programs in 
recent years, and this had some reducing effect on crop 
47 Earl Heady, Need for Land and Resource Adjustment, 
Chapter I, Dynamics of Land Use. pp. 2-3. Center for Agri-
production. The initial effect of this reduction was to 
increase gross farm income. But the distribution of this 
increase in farm income among the factors of production, 
land, labor, and capital, was determined by what had 
been done to decrease the supply of each one. And since 
only the supply of land had been reduced, and nothing 
had been done to reduce the supply of the other facrors, 
labor and capital, economic theory would lead one to ex-
pect that most of the increase in income in the short 
run, and all of it in the long run, would go to land, and 
none to labor and capital. 
Table 18 and the accompanying charts show what has 
actually been happeni-ng. 
TABLE 18-VALUE OF FARM REAL ESTATE PER ACRE, 
UNITED STATES, 1947-1962a 
(1947-49 = 100) 
Year Index numbers 
1947 94 
1948 101 
1949 105 
1950 103 
1951 119 
1952 132 
1953 132 
1954 128 
1955 133 
1956 138 
1957 147 
1958 156 
1959 168 
1960 173 
1961 177 
1962 183 
aFarmland and buildings as of March 1. 
Source: Farm Real Estate Market Developments. 
June 1962, p. 26. USDA. 
Value of Farm Real Estate Up Sharply During 1950's. 
%OF 1947 - 49 
100 
50 
1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 
OAT A. AS OF I!IA. RC:H r. JULY I AHO HOVLIII SER I 
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cultural and Economic Adjustment, Iowa State University, 
Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1961. 
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This table and chart show that the value of land per 
acre rose in a steady climb from an index base of 100 in 
1947-49 to an index of 183 in 1962. 
Table 19 and figure 16 show that the average per 
capita personal income of the farm population, from farm 
sources, rose from $640 in 1947-49 to $899 in 1961; this 
is a rise of 40 percent. Another measure of farm income 
is realized net income per farm, which rose from $2,708 
in 1947-49 to $3,360 in 1961, a rise of 24 percent. 
Thus, the value of land rose nearly twice as much, 
in percentage terms, as per capita farm income rose; the 
value of land rose nearly more than 3 times as much as 
farm income per farm. And this was in the short run. 
In the computation of these net farm income data, 
the interest which farmers pay for the funds they borrow 
to run the farm is deducted from the gross farm income 
as one of the costs. But the imputed interest which 
farmers could realize on their own funds that are invested 
in the farm, if they were invested elsewhere, is not de-
ducted as a cost. Thus, a farmer who had $100,000 of his 
own money invested in his farm might have a net in-
come of $6,000. But if he sold his farm and invested the 
proceeds in government bonds, he could get an income 
from them of $3,000 or more without working at all. 
His labor and management return on his farm was actual-
ly only $3,000. His net farm income rose from 1947-49 
to 1961 partly because the value of his land and build-
ings rose. His actual net income from his farm labor and 
management rose less than the 24 percent shown above. 
The shortcomings of these United States average 
per capita farm income data have frequently been pointed 
out. The United States farm income includes the very 
small farm incomes from the 1.3 million "farms" that are 
not really farms at all, but only country residences, with 
small acreages, for urban people earning their main in-
come from urban jobs and for retired people who like to 
live in the country. These small "farm" incomes add very 
little to the numerator, total United States farm income, 
but the 1.3 million small "farmers" add a great deal to 
TABLE 19-TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME OF THE FARM AND NONFARM POPULATION, 
AND POPULATION ESTIMATES BY RESIDENCE, 1934-61 
Farm as Population2 
Personal income percentage 
of farm of total Farm as 
Total personal population, personal percentage 
Year income1 all sources income Total Farm of Total 
(lv.Iillion dollars) (lv.Iillion dollars) (Percent) (Thousands) (Thousands) (Percent) 
1934 53,575 5, 372 10.0 126,374 32,305 25 . 6 
1940 78,680 7,632 9.7 132,122 30,547 23.1 
1950 228,468 20,376 8 . 9 151, 683 23,048 15.2 
1951 256,692 22,840 8 . 9 154,360 21, 890 14.2 
1952 273,071 22,267 8.2 157,028 21,748 13.8 
1953 288,259 20,036 7.0 159,636 19, 874 12.4 
1954 289,825 19,001 6.6 162,417 19, 019 11.7 
1955 310,196 18,314 5.9 165,270 19,078 11.5 
1956 332,943 18,582 5.6 168, 176 18,712 11.1 
1957 351,423 18,829 5.4 171,198 17, 656 10.3 
1958 360,259 20,507 5.7 174,054 17, 128 9.8 
1959 383,936 18,976 4.9 176, 912 16, 592 9.4 
1960 398,714 19,598 4 . 9 179,811 15,620 88 . 7 
1961 414,281 20,308 4.9 182,777 14 788 8.1 
1Department of Commerce series, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. 
2Farm population as of April 1 and total population as of July 1 are taken as the closest readily available approximations of 
their respective annual averages. Estimates exclude Alaska and Hawaii. 
Source: "Farm Income Situation" ERS, USDA, FIS-187, July 1962, p . 41. 
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the denominator. Thus, the average per capita farm in-
come shown by the USDA is substantially smaller than 
the actual average farm income per regular commercial 
farm. 
An article published just as this bulletin was going 
to press analyses the situation by farm income groups. 
"Average operators' net cash income per farm increased 
by a fifth during 1949-59 and showed a slight gain even 
after an adjustment for changes in the cost of living. 
These and related averages, however, convey the false im-
pression that incomes of individual farmers have made 
similar gains. The rationale for this interpretation is that 
fewer farmers mean a larger farm resource base for those 
who remain in agriculture ; thus , the farm income 'pie' 
can be divided into fewer pieces. 
"Actually, the income and farm resources that were 
contained in the farms that went out of agriculture, even 
if transferred to the farmers that remain, are too meager 
to affect appreciably either their farm resource base or 
their net income. To illustrate this point, the decrease of 
more than 1lh million in the number of farms marketing 
less than $2~500 of farm products during 1949-59 was as-
sociated with a decrease of only $1 billion in the value 
of farm products sold from this group. The decline in 
number of farms in all economic classes of less than 
$10,000 decreased the value of farm products sold from 
these economic classes of farms by only $2.5 billion. Due 
to the wide range and extreme right skewness of the 
farm income distribution, reductions in number of smaller 
farms over time can cause the mean income to increase 
even though incomes of the remaining farmers declined. 
All that is required is a greater proportionate decrease in 
number of farms (the denominator) than in farm income 
(the numerator). 4 8 
"During 1949-59, neither the substantial decline in 
the number of farms nor the rapid growth in business 
size of the remaining farms increased real net cash farm 
incomes. Real income shrank from two fifths to a fourth 
of gross receipts because of increased inputs and the de-
creased value of the dollar. Merely to maintain their farm 
incomes, farmers had to increase output by two thirds. 
Thus, despite the increase in farm size, real net income 
probably declined for all classes of farms. On smaller 
farms this decline was apparently offset by the increase 
in all off-farm incomes ; but the total income of operator 
families on farms that marketed products valued at $5,000 
or more probably declined sharply. Clearly. unadjusted 
statistical series on the number of farms of different eco-
nomic classes are not always reliable indicators of farm 
income. As this article interprets the data, real net cash 
48McElveen, Jackson V., "Farm Numbers, Farm Size and 
Farm Income" in journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 45 , No. 1, 
February 1963. pp. 9-10. 
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farm incomes on the larger commercial farms have de-
creased rather than increased."49 
Income data for commercial family farms are com-
piled by type of farming areas, in another branch of the 
USDA; they show, for most types of farms, actually, a 
decline in net farm income since 1947-49. The data are 
shown in table 20. 
These results confirm what one would expect on the 
basis of economic theory-that the benefits of a reduc-
tion in agricultural production achieved by reducing 
acreage went chiefly to the facror reduced, in this case 
land. This was true even in the short run; it is likely to 
be more true in the long run-and not a very long run, 
either. 
The kind ofsupply control program that would bene-
fit farmers rather than acres would be one that would be 
achieved by reducing the number of farmers rather than 
reducing the number of acres. 
OVERSUPPLY OF THE HUMAN FACTOR IN 
AGRICULTURE. 
Programs for controlling the input of land in agri-
culture, even if they were completely successful in bring-
ing production in line with consumption, could not solve 
the farm income problem; for they would leave the sup-
ply of farmers as great as ever, and this large supply 
would continue to depress per capita farm income. 
This situation may be represented in a supply and 
demand curve diagram with income per farmer (the 
"price of farmers") plotted up the vertical axis, and num-
bers of farmers plotted along the horizontal axis. 
The demand curve, representing the demand for 
farmers, is inelastic, much as the demand curve for farm 
products is inelastic. And the curve has been moving to 
the left as production per farmer has been increasing 
more rapidly than the demand for farm products has 
been increasing. 
The supply curve for farmers is more complicated 
than a simple straight or moderately curved line. It has 
a kink in it at the point of intersection with the demand 
curve, so that it is elastic upward to the right, but in-
elastic downward and to the left. As the demand curve 
moves to the left, the number of farmers in agriculture 
tends to remain large, because farmers engaged in farm-
ing find it difficult to pull out. Yet if the demand curve 
were to move to the right-if for example the flow of 
new technology were cut off-farmers would benefit very 
4 9 For an analysis of capital gains as income, see Dale M. 
Hoover, "The Measurement and Importance of Real Capital 
Gains in United States Agriculture, 1940 through 1959," 
j ournal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, November 
1962, pp. 929-941. 
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TABLE 20-RETURN TO OPERATOR AND FAMILY LABOR, 1956-1961. (using current charge for capital). 
Type-of-farming area 
Dairy farms: 
Central Northeast 
Eastern Wisconsin 
Western Wisconsin 
Dairy-hog farms: 
Southeastern Minnesota 
Corn Belt farms: 
Hog-dairy 
Hog-beef raising 
Hog-beef fattening 
Cash grain 
Poultry farms: 
New Jersey (egg pro-
ducing) 
Cotton farms: 
Southern Piedmont 
Texas: 
Black Prairie 
High Plains (nonirri-
gated) 
High Plains (irrigated) 
Mississippi Delta: 
Small 
Large-scale 
Peanut-cotton farms: 
Southern Coastal Plains 
Tobacco farms: 
Kentucky: 
Tobacco-livestock 
(inner) 
Tobacco-dairy 
(intermediate) 
Tobacco-dairy (outer) 
North Carolina: 
Tobacco-cotton 
Tobacco-cotton(large) 
Tobacco (small) 
Spring wheat farms: 
Northern Plains: 
Wheat-small grain-
livestock 
Wheat-corn-live-
stock 
Wheat-roughage-live-
stock 
Winter wheat farms: 
Southern Plains 
Wheat 
Wheat-grain -sorghum 
Pacific Northwest: 
Wheat-pea 
Wheat-fallow 
Cattle ranches: 
Northern Plains 
Intermountain Region 
Southwest 
Sheep ranches: 
Northern Plains 
Southwest 
1947-49 
2,926 
1,883 
1, 684 
2,960 
4,037 
2,504 
8,199 
6,388 
4,626 
2,781 
2,336 
5,137 
8,"637 
1,645 
15,081 
2,013 
3,768 
1,858 
2, 715 
2,480 
2,564-
1,965 
4,980 
4,694 
4,150 
7,628 
6,978 
8,026 
10,470 
3,833 
5,918 
1,720 
4,094 
403 
1956 
2,509 
1,098 
2,013 
2,496 
2,638 
1,376 
3,075 
5,660 
255 
656 
-314 
815 
8,798 
1,468 
14,914 
2,173 
2, 385 
1, 863 
3,100 
2,531 
2,907 
2, 391 
5,298 
1,594 
1,335 
742 
-725 
7,341 
3,251 
- 661 
3,216 
-5,999 
2,664 
-5,985 
1957 
2,700 
1, 038 
2,150 
2,013 
3,464 
1,693 
4,181 
2,083 
-320 
600 
286 
4,169 
6,222 
822 
3,453 
1,594 
1,200 
1,459 
2,582 
1,095 
670 
1,421 
1, 993 
3,402 
2, 776 
2,854 
1, 336 
6,263 
9,219 
405 
5,401 
-1,187 
7,130 
-1, 196 
1958 
2,227 
436 
1,989 
1,892 
4,173 
2,541 
5,791 
1,854 
-636 
1,595 
1,244 
5,818 
12,250 
611 
4, 509 
2,604 
1,515 
1,610 
2,906 
1,928 
1,876 
1,935 
3, 758 
4, 095 
2, 504 
8, 621 
6,899 
440 
5,600 
2,409 
8, 911 
1,530 
8,130 
764 
1959 
2,102 
919 
1, 866 
1,190 
2,002 
599 
2,322 
153 
- 4,336 
734 
526 
3,923 
7,270 
1,495 
20,049 
1,486 
246 
1, 408 
2,409 
1,183 
929 
1,536 
156 
-407 
-984 
3, 221 
5, 851 
6, 824 
7,637 
1,002 
8,054 
536 
3,079 
402 
Note: Small discrepancies exist between some years due to revisions of the data. 
1960 
1,771 
386 
1,763 
559 
1,410 
123 
619 
937 
2,570 
332 
-54 
5,410 
6, 923 
871 
10,918 
2,110 
1,255 
1,128 
2,100 
1, 896 
1, 971 
2,212 
1 ,866 
2,436 
2,616 
4,926 
6,762 
281 
3,326 
19 
3,649 
-2,220 
1,992 
-2,391 
1961 
(preliminary) 
2,100 
1,203 
2,553 
1,748 
2,884 
873 
2,888 
2,896 
1,989 
991 
663 
9,856 
15,614 
1,172 
17,297 
2,866 
2,228 
2,449 
2,417 
1,804 
1,632 
2, 714 
-2,619 
2,549 
-1,397 
5, 231 
7,193 
716 
2,826 
1,579 
4, 863 
-832 
1,414 
- 2, 839 
Source: Costs and returns on commercial farms, long-term study, 1930-57. U. S. Stat. Bul. 297. 1961. Farm 
costs and returns commercial farms by type, size, and location. U. S. Agr. In£. Bul. 230. Rev. 1961, Rev. 1962. 
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little, because the birth rate on farms is high and a con-
tinuous excess of farmers is being produced each year. An 
increase in the demand for farmers would simply be met 
by a corresponding increase in the number of farm boys 
who would decide to stay in farming in response to only 
a small increase in "price" (income per farmer) . 
In this situation, production control alone can solve 
only part-accually, a small part-of the problem. It can 
raise total United States farm income, but it cannot deal 
effectively with the other part of the problem that re-
sults from the excessive supply of farmers and keeps in-
come per farmer low. This excessive supply of farmers 
continues to depress the return to farmers -their per 
capita net income-just as an excessive supply of farm 
products depresses the prices of those products. Dealing 
with this parr of the low farm income problem calls for 
measures to reduce the number of farmers. 
The large supply of farm operators relative to the 
demand for them results from two things : (1 ) the high 
farm birth rate and difficulties that impede movement 
off farms-this keeps the supply of farm operators high; 
and (2) the decline in the-demand for farm labor, largely 
as a result of rapid technological advance and mechaniza-
tion-this reduces the demand for farm operators and 
farm labor. 
The farm birth rate alone is high enough to result 
in a continuous increase in the number of farmers if all 
boys born on farms stay in farming. Farm births exceed 
farm deaths by about 400,000 per year. 
The high birth rate on farms can be measured in 
another way. "Replacement indexes" show the number 
of young children present in a population group in rela-
tion to the number needed to replace the female popula-
tion of childbearing age. An index of 100 (termed 
"unity") would signify exact replacement and a popula-
tion potentially stationary in numbers. 5 0 In 1950, the 
United States replacement index figure for "all farm-
operator households" was 168.5 1 (The figure for com-
mercial farms was 171). That is to say : the number of 
farm children was at least 68 percent higher than the 
number needed to maintain a stationary farm population. 
The demand for numbers of farmers is. declining, 
and farm practices have become more labor saving. In-
creased mechanization and machinery size have increased 
the size of farm that a family can handle. The average 
size of farm in the United States increased from 174 acres 
in 1940 to 215 acres in 1950 to 302 acres in 1959. The 
number of commercial farms dropped 21 percent from 
5
°Farm Population-Characteristics of Farm-Operator 
Households by Number of Young Children, USDA AMS-
118 June 1956, p. 9. 
51 lbid., p. 25. 
47 
1947-49 to 1955-57. The most efficient size of farm in 
Iowa now is about 350 acres. 52 
The farm population in the United States declined 
from a peak of more than 32 million in 1933 to about 
15 million now. But the decline has not been rapid 
enough to keep ahead of the decline in demand for farm-
ers. 
For every 100 farm operators between the ages of 
20-64 in the United States, there were 168 boys living on 
farms who reached the age of 20 in the decade 1950-1960. 
For every 100 farm operators between the ages 25-69, 
135 farm boys reached age 25 during this decade. (U. S. 
Bureau of the Census, "Farm Population," Series Census-
AMS, P-27, No. 22, 1956) . 
And this does not take into account the continual 
decrease in the number of farms. For the last five years 
this decrease has been at the rate of 89,000 farms per 
year, or about two farms per township. 
According to a recent estimate, if present trends con-
tinue, only 10 to 15 percent of the farm boys reaching 
20 between the years 1954-63 are likely to find good 
farming opportunities on farms which can net them 
more than $2,500 per year. 53 
This estimate may be too low. "During 1950-59, 
the number of young farmers with gross incomes over 
$10,000 increased by 156,000, far in excess of the 54,000 
units with similar incomes which were made available by 
the withdrawal of older operators. 
"This statement should not be interpreted to mean 
that there are plentiful opportunities in farming for young 
people. But it does mean that estimates of opportunities, 
based on expected retirements and deaths of operators of 
already existing 'adequate' units, are too low. The pro-
cess of creating larger farm units is in part a result of the 
changes in size of farm made by younger operators soon 
after their start in farming." 54 
Earlier in the same paper, however, (on p. 54) the 
same author points out that Census data on the propor-
tion of the farm boys entering farming decreased from a 
third from 1939 to 1949 to a fourth or less from 1949 to 
1959. A projection of this downward trend, or even a 
horizontal trend after 1959, would be not much in excess 
of Shoemaker's estimate. 
52 Heady, Earl 0 ., and Krenz, Ronald D., "How Big 
Will Our Farms Get?", Iowa Farm Science, Vol. 16, No.5, 
pp. 3-5, November 1961. 
53 Karl Shoemaker, "Opportunities and Limitations for 
Employment of Farm People Within and Outside of Farm-
ing." USDA Federal Extension Service Mimeograph, 1958. 
5 4 Kanel, Don, "Farm Adjustments by Age Groups, 
North Central States 1950-1959" in Journal of Farm Eco-
nomics, Vol. 45 , No. 1. February 1963, pp. 58-60. 
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TABLE 21-EDUCATION BASED ON FATHER'S OCCUPATION 
Percentage of 
Father's Occupation 
Percentage of 
high school 
graduates who 
enter college 
Percentage of 
college entrants 
who graduate 
from college 
high school 
graduates who 
also graduate 
from college 
Professional and semi-professional 
Managerial 
White colar- clerical, sales, service 
Factory , craftsmen, unskilled, etc. 
Farmer 
67 
50 
48 
26 
24 
60 
55 
57 
58 
44 
40 
28 
27 
15 
11 
Source: Dael Wolfe; America's Resources of Specialized T alent, Harper & Bros. New York, 1954, p. 160. 
What is needed to increase income per farmer on 
more than a temporary basis is a program to reduce the 
continuing excess of farmers that results from the high 
birth rate on farms. 
In the past, the reduction in farm population came 
about not so much by established farmers moving out of 
farming, as by young farm boys and girls-potential 
farmers-refraining from going into farming. They choose 
other occupations instead of going into farming. This is 
much easier than going into farming and then trying to 
get out. For the future, then, the chief emphasis needs 
to be put on programs to reduce the inflow of potential 
young farmers into farming, more than on helping estab-
lished farmers to move out. If farm boys and girls who 
will not be needed in agriculture are informed about job 
opportunities in other occupations and given education 
and training for those other jobs, they can move into 
them much more easily than older farmers can. 
OBSTACLES TO MOBILITY. 
The obstacles to mobility are considerable, however, 
even for young farm boys and girls. They are: 
Insufficient General Education 
Are farm raised youth well enough trained to com-
pete with urban youth for town and city jobs? 
The answer for most of them is "No." Farm-reared 
adults living in nonfarm places in the United States have 
more than their proportional share of low status and low 
income occupations. 
Relative to the rest of the population, few farm 
children who graduate from high school go on to college. 
And a relatively high percentage of those who do start 
to college drop out and do not graduate. 
The data given in table 21 show the educational 
handicap of farmers' children in the United States. 
Our society is missing an opportunity to provide 
college training for many bright young rural people. Few 
if any of us would argue that there is an inherent differ-
ence in the mental capacity of rural and urban children. 
Many farm youths are handicapped by a lack ofhigh 
school education. Farm-reared young men and women 
have far less high school as well as .less college educa-
tion than those living off farms. 5 5 
Table 22 shows that farm-reared adults working in 
factories, offices, and shops include more than twice their 
proportionate share of persons with no thore than a grade 
school education. 
TABLE 22-LEVEL OF LAST COMPLETED YEAR 
OF EDUCATION. (IN PERCENT) 
Farm-reared 
Nonfarm-reared 
Grade 
school 
60 
27 
High 
school College 
31 
54 
9 
19 
Total 
100 
100 
Source: Freedman and Freedman: "Farm-Reared Elements 
in the Nonfarm Population of the U. S. A.," 
Rural Sociology, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1956, 
pp. 50-61. 
The lack of education shows up in the earning 
power of farm-reared people living in towns and cities. 
Table 23 shows that they have more than their propor-
tionate share of low status and low income occupations. 
Insufficient Training for Urban Jobs 
If as suggested above, there are good opportunities 
in farming for only about 15 percent of the boys growing 
55Vocational training for rural youth, NP A Agricultural 
Committee, September 1960, Special Report No. 58, pp. 6-7. 
TABLE 23-FAMILY INCOME OF ADULT NONFARM POPULATION IN 1952 (IN PERCENT) 
Farm-reared 
Nonfarm- reared 
Less than 
$2,000 
30 
11 
Source: Freedman and Freedman, ibid. 
$2,000-
$4,000 
40 
39 
$4,000-
$5,000 
12 
17 
48 
Family inconie 
$5,000- $7, 500- $10,000 
$7,500 $10,000 or more Total 
14 3 1 100 
21 7 5 100 
1- '
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up on farms, the other 85 percent need to move into 
better paying urban jobs, and they need proper training 
for those jobs. 
Yet at present, the greater emphasis is still placed 
on "voc-ag" training for the 15 percent who can remain 
in farming. What is needed is greatly expanded "voc-ind" 
training facilities for the 85 percent who will go into 
agricultural-related or industrial urban jobs. 
This is not a call for less voc-ag training for farm boys; 
the country needs more college-trained farmers. It is a call 
for more voc-ind training for farm boys and girls, five to 
ten times greater in scale than the present voc-ag set-up. 
Technical high schools which can provide this kind 
of training are located in most of the big cities in the 
United States. They are not, however, a part of the gen-
eral educational systems of the states ; they are set up to 
serve only a portion of the students in a particular city's 
school district. Iowa has only one in the whole state, lo-
cated in Des Moines. 
Other states have a variety of these and other types 
of technical schools, but there is need for greatly increased 
facilities of this type all over the country. 56 
Lack of Clarity and Unanimity of Means for 
Attaining Objectives Among the Different 
Programs. 
Even the programs to help excess farmers move off 
farms are not clear and unanimous in the means that they 
are working out to attain their objectives. 
Three different programs concerned with rural de-
velopment have been set up : 
Rural Development Program (RDP) 
Rural Areas Development Program (RADP) 
Area Redevelopment Program (ARP) 
The first of these, the Rural Development Program, 
was passed by Congress in the latter part of 1955. On 
January 11, 1959, President Eisenhower had asked Secre-
tary of Agriculture Benson to "give special attention to 
the problems peculiar to small farmers." The results of 
this study appeared in an agricultural bulletin which was 
published in April 1955 , and entitled, "Development of 
Agriculture's Human Resources. " It was transmitted to 
Congress as House Document # 149. This became the 
basis of the Rural Development Program. 
Its main feature is the emphasis placed on self-help. 
In 1961 Don Paarlberg, formerly Assistant to the 
Secretary of Agriculture under the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration, published an appraisal of the first six years of the 
rural development programs. 57 In his opinion the main 
56!. W . Arthur, "On Vocational-Technical Education," 
Iowa Farm Science, Vol. 15 , No. 7, January 1961, pp. 7-8. 
See also, "Education Beyond High-School Age, The 
Community College," Iowa State Department of Public In-
struction, 60th Iowa General Assembly, December 1962. 
57
"Rural Development Achievements and Shortcomings 
as Seen at the Federal Level," journal of Farm Economics, 
XLIII :5, December 1961, pp. 1511-18. 
49 
achievement of the RDP was the fact the problems of 
small farmers which previously had been glossed over 
were brought into the open so that they could be better 
understood. He listed four of the most important prob-
lems which the program faced: 
1. The existence of rural poverty. 
2. The poor utilization of human resources in agri-
culture. 
3. The failure of the price support programs to help 
the small operator. 
4. The limited opportunity which now exists in 
agriculture to operate farms. 
His major criticism of the program were the lack of 
sufficiently large funds and the tendency to dilute the pro-
gram's effect over too large an area. 
With the change from the Eisenhower to the Ken-
nedy Administration in 1961, the Rural Development 
Program was replaced by the Rural Areas Development 
Program in which the original plan was broadened and 
extended. 
Rural Areas Development is a program of the 
USDA. It is not to be confused with the Area Redevel-
opment Program which is a program of the U. S. De-
partment of Commerce. The USDA has certain assigned 
responsibilities in Area Redevelopment, but these re-
sponsibilities are distinct and separate from RAD. Area 
Redevelopment came into existence with the passing of 
Public Law 87-27, known as the "depressed areas bill," 
on May 1, 1961. Four hundred and sixty-eight (468) 
predominantly rural-farm counties in 38 states were desig-
nated as eligible for assistance under ARP. 
There is considerable divergence of views on the ap-
propriate means or methods of helping farmers attain 
higher incomes. 
One of the views is reflected in the foreword to a 
recently published RAD handbook: 
Foreworcf' 8 
" With the complexities and special problems of 
urban living, with the huge public and social costs of 
overcoming the problems of large-scale urban popula-
tion growth, and the implications of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological war, it would seem sensible to direct 
National policy toward the maintenance of population 
in rural areas. In fact, these serious social and economic 
problems of large urban concentrations would justify 
renewed emphasis on the stream of thought popular-
ized by Thomas Jefferson that rural America might be 
a good place sociologically for a sizable share of our 
population to live and work. 
"The job of selecting and building new industry 
to provide productive employment for surplus farm 
population is complicated and difficult. It involves 
many talents inside and outside of agriculture." 
58
"Pegs for Rural Progress," Rural Areas Development 
Handbook, USDA Agriculture Handbook No. 229, 1962, p.2 . 
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This statement has some attractive features, but in 
practice it leads to some difficulties. 
In many areas, the program proceeds to try to induce 
industry to move in where the farmers are, rather than 
help the farmers to move to where the jobs are. This is 
sens~~le enough, if the areas have other desirable features 
for the industry concerned-good location with respect 
to raw materials and markers, adequate transportation, 
adequate water supplies, etc. But in many cases, these 
other features do not exist. An industry may be induced 
to move in by the offer of a free site, tax privileges, etc., 
only to languish and fail, leaving the area worse off than 
before. 
This emphasis on bringing industry in, rather than 
helping farmers out, frequently leads to an attitude nat-
urally fostered by local business, that regards a decline in 
the local population in the area as a disaster-something 
to be resisted rather than encouraged. Thus, a move to 
help farmers migrate to better jobs elsewhere, generally 
favored by economists, is resisted rather than supported 
by local committees of businessmen, school boards, etc. 
Those who hold these divergent views find themselves 
working at cross-purposes in the RAD program. 
FARMER ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. 
What kind of a "farmer adjustment" program might 
be devised to help those farmers who want to leave farm-
ing, and get a more useful job in town, to do so? And 
how much might it cost? 
A number of years ago, T. W. Schultz proposed a 
"Homesteads in Reverse" program in brief general terms, 
under which farm families would be offered funds to 
help them move off farms and retrain for urban jobs. 59 
A program of this sort is spelled out in greater detail 
below: 60 
Farmers who were interested in moving off their 
farms into urban employment would be offered some spe-
cial services for moving, retraining, etc., and a grant of 
money to help them carry their plans through. 
An intensive training program should be established 
which would help prepare the participant for a nonfarm 
job. This program should be directed toward three major 
areas: (1) training of members of family who are not 
now farming but who will be available for a job in the 
near future; (2) training of the entire family for living 
in a different environment concerning various social prob-
59T. W. Schultz, "Homesteads in Reverse" Farm Policy 
Forum, Vol. 8, No. 5, 1956, pp. 12-15 . See also his "A Policy 
to Redistribute Losses from Economic Progress" journal of 
Farm Economics, XLIII:3, August 1961, pp. 554-65. 
60This program outline is adapted from R. S. Dougan, 
"Resource Adjustment through a Voluntary Transfer of Hu-
man Resources out of Agriculture," Ag. Extension Service, 
Ohio State University, 1961. 
50 
lems which might arise; (3) intensive training of each 
farmer who would be making a complete change in his 
vocation. 
The education function could be administered by 
existing educational agencies in cooperation with employ-
ment services and private industries. The nature of the 
job openings would be different enough to require 
separate types of training programs. Actually, this phase 
of the program would vary a great deal, according to the 
family's current situation. Such training aid also could 
be made available to nonfarmers who are interested in 
changing jobs. This special training would continue until 
a period of time after the family became established in 
the nonfarm job. 
Cost of Proposed Program 
The cost of the program described here, of course, 
would vary with the size of payment to each family in-
duced to move. Five thousand dollars average value of 
money and services is suggested. 61 Included in this would 
be a payment of $3,000 cash divided over the five-year 
period of the contract. 
It is recommended that the $3,000 not be given to 
the farmer in a lump sum, but in terms of so much each 
year for three years-i.e.-$1,500 the first year, $1,000 
the second year and $500 the third year. 
It would be expected that the cost of services pro-
vided to the family for moving, for training, etc., would 
average about $2,000. This added to the $3,000 paid in 
cash adds up to the total $5,000 payment. 
If this would cause 250,000 eligible farm families to 
move per year, the cost would be $1.25 billion per year. 
Other costs such as administration, preparation of 
material on occupational opportunities, training, etc., 
would amount to a considerable sum. One might esti-
mate an average cost of one billion dollars per year for 
this type of activity. 
Appraisal of the Schultz and Dougan Proposals 
The program outlined above is directed at the root 
of the farm adjustment problem. The chief obstacles that 
lie in its path arise from the huge sums of money and 
enormous problems of administration that would be in-
volved in translating such a proposal into a program. 
The cost of helping families to move from one oc-
cupation to another, in terms of money and tribulation, 
are high. It runs into billions of dollars. The cost of not 
helping them are also high, probably higher. Is there 
any way to get the job done at less cost? 
A kind of preventive medicine could be used for this 
purpose. After a family has become established in farm-
ing, a major personal and financial effort is required to 
61 This is the same figure that Schultz suggested a few 
years earlier. 
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help them t-o move. The job could be done at only a 
fraction of that cost, however, if the program were fo-
cused not on the families that are already established in 
farming, but on the farm boys and girls as they are grow-
ing up, say at about high school age, before they have 
become established in any occupation. Only a small 
amount of information and money is required to help a 
farm boy or girl to decide which fork of the road to 
take-into farming, or into some other occupation-com-
pared with the size of the job after he has already chosen 
the farm road and established himself and his family in 
it. It is far easier to reduce the flow of young people into 
farming than to speed up the outflow of old people. 
Job Information 
What is needed is a nationwide program of infor-
mation concerning alternative job opportunities, salaries, 
and training required for them, focused upon teenage 
farm boys and girls before they have chosen their oc-
cupations. 
If there really are good opportunities on the farm 
for only 15 percent of them, they should be informed 
about this. They need also to be informed what other oc-
cupations are in need of more men, and what training is 
needed for them. If the 85 percent were bel ped into bet-
ter urban jobs, within a few years the excessive number 
of farmers on farms would decrease. Therefore, as the 
program continued, the total number of farmers would 
decline to that number which could make as good a liv-
ing on farms as in other occupations. Those who moved 
off the farm would be better off. Those who remained 
wo1.1ld benefit, and the nation as a whole would have a 
higher level of living. 
TRAINING FOR NONFARM JOBS. 
The job-information service could be performed rela-
tively inexpensively- much of it, by already existing 
agencies expanded in this direction for this purpose. Bur 
along with this service would need to go a substantial 
program of training for nonfarm jobs, both for the farm 
boys and girls, who were ready to starr preparations for 
their life occupation, and for the farm men and women 
who were already engaged in farming but wanted to move 
out. 
The basic importance of education and training is 
emphasized by Varden Fuller of the University of Cali-
fornia. He raises the question whether the widely made 
appeals for accelerated off-farm migration are addressed 
to the proper question. 62 
62Varden Fuller, "Factors Influencing Farm Labor Mo-
bility," Chapter 3 of Labor Mobility and Population in Agri-
culture, Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and 
Economic Adjustment, ISU Press , 1961 , pp. 34-35, Ames, 
Iowa. 
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In his words, "It has been commonly recommended 
that proper therapy for several of the pathologic condi-
tions in agriculture required some people to move some-
where else. Various notions of income disadvantage have 
been the principal element of the syndrome. For some 
writers, the prescriptive image has been that people 
should not persist in agriculture if they can do better 
elsewhere. For others, the image has been that somebody 
should get out of agriculture so that those who remain 
can do better. Although the validity of these propositions 
(especially the latter one) is suspect, I will press on to 
my own allegation that both fail to address basic patho-
logy, and if the prescription is right, it is by chance. 
"The essence of demoncratic society is not maximum 
or equal income but equal and unrestrained opportunity 
to be productive. Identifiable pockets of poverty may be 
attributable to disabilities in an area economy or to dis-
abilities in the population or to a combination to the 
two. Ourmigration from such a pocket may relieve the 
burden upon an underpar local economy, but it is likely 
only to transfer elsewhere the disabilities of irs migrating 
populace. Disabilities associated with poor education, 
poor physical or mental health , or discrimination should 
presumably be as solvable in place as elsewhere. Such 
problems are nor actually solved by getting them our of 
sight or through attenuation elsewhere, regardless of 
whatever asepsis that may occur in the income statistics 
of the places of evacuation. 
"Under the circumstances in prospect, it is important 
that a distinction be recognized between the development 
of capacity to be productive and therefore to be mobile 
as against the more superficial notion of motivating the 
movement of disadvantaged people to some place where 
it is assumed they will be better off. If primary emphasis 
is placed upon developing capacity, it may be found that 
preferred solutions can be found for many within the 
locale of their present domiciles. Proposing better edu-
cation, of course, is not unusual. Moreover, it is usual to 
imply that the immediate purpose of better education is 
to enhance mobility. For example, D. Gale Johnson em-
phasizes primary and secondary education in farm areas, 
bur he also clearly regards this education as being valu-
able because it will better prepare people to move some-
where else. What I am attempting to say is let us have 
the educational, health, and manpower policies that will 
result in capable, self-dependent people and leave the 
question of where and at what they will work to them." 
The manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962 is a good step in the direction of providing the kind 
of training that farm boys and girls need. The Act is na-
tional in scope, covering all occupations; it has import-
ant implications for agriculture. 
"Basically, the act authorizes an adult education pro-
gram for two classes of people : (1) those whose skills 
have been rendered obsolete by the advance of tech-
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nology and by dislocations in the economy, and (2) those 
new entrants to the labor force who with further educa-
tion will be able to meet "shifting employment needs." 
Although the word "education" does not appear in the 
title of the act. Manpower development and training is 
conceived in broad terms to include on-the-job and vo-
cational training, as well as formal school:ing. The act 
specifically cites the need for better trained personnel in 
the professional, scientific, technical, and 'apprenticeable' 
fields. Normally, however, the 52-week training allow-
ance limitation will permit only limited upgrading of 
educational levels of individuals qualifying for benefits 
under· the act."63 
"If unemployment were defined in the act according 
to the conventional Bureau of Labor Statistics definition, 
many persons engaged in farming would be ineligible 
for either the training priorities or the allowances be-
cause of their inability to meet the unemployment cri-
teria. To a certain extent this problem is obviated by the 
crucial sentence in the act, 'Workers in farm families 
with less than $1,200 annual net family income shall be 
considered unemployed for purposes of the act.' Al-
though there is a matter of interpretation as to the farm 
classification of rural-nonfarm families in the agricultural 
labor force and a matter of judgement regarding the pre-
cise $1,200 dividing line determining eligibility, leaders 
in rural areas will recognize the importance of this pro-
vision both for the welfare of farm people and for the 
development of rural areas. Such a provision would be 
of importance to any self-employed person, in or out of 
farming, but it is of special importance in farming be-
cause of the large number of self-employed people in 
agriculture and because so many of them are at the low 
end of the income distribution. As to rural persons not 
living in farm families, full benefits under the act will 
accrue only to those meeting the conventional BLS un-
employment criterion."64 
The success of a program to help excess farmers to 
move into nonfarm jobs depends upon those nonfarm 
jobs being available. The rate of unemployment in the 
United States persists in recent years at about 6 percent, 
and this makes it more difficult for farmers to find jobs 
in town. 65 
Even with over-all unemployment at 6 percent, how-
ever, the prospects for employment in nonfarm jobs are 
63 Bachmura, Frank T. , "The Manpower Development 
and Training Act of 1962-lts Significance for Rural Areas," 
j ournal of Farm Economics, Vol. 45, No. 1. February, 1963, p. 
61. 
640p. cit. pp. 62-63. 
65
" Policies tO Improve the Labor Transfer Process," 
American Economic Review, Vol. L, No. 2, May 1960, pp. 403-
412. 
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far brighter than the prospects in farm work. Table 24 
shows that farming is the only occupation which is ex-
pected to require fewer workers in 1970 than in 1960. 
The prospects are for no change in the number of indus-
trial laborers. For all other groups, for jobs that require 
considerable training, substantial increases are projected. 
TABLE 24- EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 
1960 AND PROJECTED 1970 (IN MILLIONS) 
Occupational group 1960 1970 
Professional and technical 7.4 10.4 
Proprietors and managers 7.1 8.8 
Clerical and sales 13.9 17. 6 
Craftsmen (sl:<illed) 8 .7 10. 8 
Operatives (semiskilled) 12.5 14. 8 
Laborers, industrial 3 . 8 3.8 
Service occupations 8 .1 10.1 
Farm occuQations 5.9 4.9 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor. 
REDUCING THE INPUT OF LABOR MIGHT NOT 
IMMEDIATELY REDUCE AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION. 
It is not at all certain that the immediate effect of 
reducing the input of farm labor and management would 
be to reduce farm production. 
A part of the reduction in the input of labor would 
be effected by a reduction in hired labor. In most cases, 
however, the farmer would not produce less on that ac-
count; he would replace the labor by larger implements, 
automated feeding operations, and so forth. In the early 
stages, at least, this would be as likely to increase pro-
duction as to decrease it. 
The rest of the reduction in the number of farmers 
would be accomplished by a reduction in the number of 
farms, affected by a consolidation of the smaller farms 
into larger ones. Agricultural production then would pass 
into the hands of larger farm operators, presumably bet-
ter managers and more efficient operators than the smaller 
farmers they bought out. A part of their efficiency would 
show up in the form of an increase in yields, so that 
again in the early stages, a reduction in the input of 
labor would increase agricultural production, not decrease 
it. 
That is to say: Farm labor and management is so 
excessive in agriculture that the first effect of a small re-
duction in numbers would be the recombination of a 
good many farms into fewer, larger, and better managed 
farms, so that the first effect might be to increase rather 
than decrease production. This would be all the more 
likely if the farmers who moved out of agriculture were 
mostly the less efficient farmers. 
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Accordingly, the reduction in the number of farmers 
would need to be rather substantial. Otherwise the de-
pressing effect of the increase in production on the nu-
merator-United States total farm income-would not be 
offset by the decrease in the denominator (the number 
of farmers to be divided into the United States total fatm 
income) so that average farm income would not rise. 
At the end of a closely reasoned empirical study of 
this question, one investigator concluded: 
"It has been indicated that the output effect of re-
ducing the farm labor input depends upon the circum-
stances prevailing prior to the reduction. In a static situa-
tion , if the factor markets are far enough out of equili-
brium, a decline in labor input could be associated with 
an increase in output. It was noted that a reduction in 
labor input in agriculture is associated with a reduction 
in the number of producing units and that the resource 
combinations resulting might actually increase output. 
"A simple model was used to estimate the relation-
ship between labor input and average earnings per farm 
worker. The model, which was based on an implied re-
lationship between the average and the marginal physical 
product of labor, explained a very large fraction of the 
variance of labor earnings, whether measured in money 
or real terms. The model also shows that output need not 
be reduced absolutely as a result of a labor outflow from 
agriculture in order for an increase in real labor earnings 
to occur."66 
Apparently, the "disequilibrium" (oversupply of 
labor) in this case is severe enough so that the initial 
stages of a reduction in the number of farmers might 
increase total agricultural production rather than reduce 
it. 
The increasing effect of a reduction in the number 
of farmers upon total agricultural production (and there-
fore the depressing effect on total agricultural gross in-
come) might be more than offset, however, by a more 
direct increasing effect on per farmer net income. 
This direct increasing effect on per farmer net in-
come would result from the reduction in the existing ex-
cessive competition among farmers for available farms. 
This competition drives farmers to bid away a large part 
of their per capita gross income in the form of high rents 
or purchase prices for land, so that their per capita net 
incomes remain low. 
As matters stand at present, a farmer will bid a high 
rent for a farm, because if he does not, he knows that 
some other farmer will. If that other farmer were not 
there, the first farmer would not have to bid so high. 
66Johnson, D. Gale, "Output and Income Effects of Re-
ducing the Farm Labor Force," journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 
XLII, No. 4, November 1960, p. 796. 
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"THE AGRICULTURAL INCOME PROBLEM" IS NOT 
A SINGLE PROBLEM. 
It needs to be emphasized that "the agricultural in-
come problem" is not a single uniform problem all over 
the country. It is worse in some areas that in others. The 
reasons for the problems, and therefore the remedies, 
differ considerably from area to area. Along with a gen-
eral program for reducing the number of surplus farms 
and farmers in agricultural production, therefore, needs 
to go a supplementary differentiated program to deal 
separately with the different areas. 
Figure 17 shows that the low farm income areas are 
located chiefly in the South East, with smaller areas in 
the northern Lake states, the far Northwest, and North-
western New Mexico. Figure 18 is based on more recent 
data, including some non-farm data ; it shows a similar 
pattern. 
These charts over-emphasize the low income situa-
tion to some extent, because they are based on Census 
farm data which include a substantial number of farms 
that are too small to be considered full-fledged commer-
cial farms. 
These charts show clearly that "the farm income 
problem" is not a single even roughly uniform problem 
over the United States. It is no more sensible to refer to 
"the farm problem" than it is to refer to "the over-weight 
problem" in the United States, as if it could be solved 
by one remedy applied to all. Specific programs for spe-
cific areas and types of farming are needed. 
Some of the land-input control programs are spe-
cific to specific commodities, such as the feed grain and 
wheat programs, and they affect . chiefly the commercial 
farms. But the problems even in these areas differ greatly, 
and require different programs too. 
These differences are clearly shown by the costs and 
returns data for typical types of commercial farms in over 
30 different areas in the United States. These data are 
compiled annually by the USDA. 67 They show the gross 
incomes, costs, net incomes, and net returns to farm 
family labor and management in considerable detail, 
separately for each type of farm. The locations of these 
type-of-farming areas are shown in figure 19. 
These data are not diluted by the inclusion of a large 
percentage of small not-really-farms, as the Census data 
are. In addition, they separate out from the net incomes 
(which include returns to the farmer's own investment 
in the farm, in the case of the United States average farm 
income data) the net return to farm family labor, leaving 
the net return to operator and family labor. Three rep-
67 Farm Costs and Returns, Ag. Inf. Bul. No. 230, ERS, 
USDA, June 1931. 
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LOW-INCOME AND LEVEL-OF-LIVING AREAS IN AGRICULTURE 
GENERALIZED AREAS 
1. APPALACHIAN MOUNT A INS AND BORDER AREAS 
2 . SOUTHERN PIEDMONT AND COASTAL PLAINS. 
3 SOUTHEASTERN HILLY. 
MISSI SS IPPI DELTA . 
SANOY COASTAL PLAINS OF ARK .. LA ., AND TEX 
6 OZARK ·OUACHITA MOUNTAINS AND BORDER 
7 NORTHERN LAKE STATES 
8 NORTHWESTERN NEW MEXICO 
9 CASCADE AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN AREAS 
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SUBSTANTIAL 
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MODERATE 
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CRITERIA* 
Less than $1,000 residual farm 
income to operator and family 
with level-of-living index below 
the regional overage and 25% 
or more of commercial forms 
classified as " low-production". 
2. Level-of- living index in 
lowest fifth of the notion. 
3. 50% or more of commercial 
forms classified as 
" low-production' ' 
NEG. 1804-55 (9) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE 
Fig. 18 
RELATIVE ECONOMIC STATUS OF COUNTIES, 1960* 
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OF All fAMillf~ (21 l'ttO,.ORTIOH OF COMMfiCJAL fARMS IN 
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LOCATION OF TYPES OF FARMS STUDIED 
'*DATA HOT YET REVISED AND THEREFORE OWTTEO FROM THIS REPORT 
4 AREAS UHDER STUDY BUT REFORTS HOT COMP~ETED 
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
resentative charts of these data are shown in figures 20, 
21, and 22 . 
These charts dead y show the differences in the dif-
ferent types of farming. The winter wheat chart shows 
NEG. 59(5).174 AGR I CULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
the violent fluctuations in gross and net income and in 
returns to operator and family labor that result chiefly 
from irregular variations in weather; programs to stabil-
ize returns, of a crop-insurance or other type, are needed 
Fig. 20-Winter Wheat Farms, Southern Plains, 1930-61 (1961 Figures 
Preliminary). 
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Fig. 22-Hog-Beef Fattening Farms; Corn Belt, 1930-1961 ( 1961 Figures 
Preliminary). 
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here. The hog-beef fattening chart shows different char-
acteristics-less variability in returns, with the variability 
associated with prices rather than with weather, and costs 
which constitute a much higher percentage of gross in-
comes than in the case of winter wheat, and which have 
increased so much that they brought returns down almost 
to zero in 1955 and 1960. The cash grain corn belt farms 
are still different; they had very stable gross incomes after 
1946, but also had a steady increase in costs and in the 
charge for capital which brought returns in 1960 down 
to zero. 
Equality of Incomes 
With adequate programs of job-information and job 
training such as those outlined above, the continuous 
excess of farmers could be helped to move off farms into 
better jobs in town. This would benefit them; it would 
benefit those who remained on farms; and it would bene-
fit the nation as a whole. The farm income problem 
would be solved as nearly as it can be in this imperfect 
world, and would continue to remain solved. 
Equilibrium might be reached, however, with per 
capita farm money incomes still lower than per capita 
urban money incomes. There are two reasons for this. 
1. A study by Kaldor, et. al. 6 8 indicates that a con-
siderable percentage of farm boys value the nonmoney 
characteristics of farm life highly; as many as one-third 
of them would prefer to farm even at money income 20 
percent lower than they could earn in town. To their 
minds, the total psychic income-money plus such non-
money characteristics as freedom, uncongested housing, 
etc.-would be equal to what they would have in town. 
This comes down ultimately to a question of values, 
which usually are considered sacrosanct. If large numbers 
of farm boys prefer to farm, earning 20 percent less than 
they could earn in town, that is usually considered to be 
a kind of value-judgement to be accepted as given. 
6 8 Donald R. Kaldor, Eber Eldridge, Lee G. Burchinal 
and I. W. Arthur, "Non-income Values Important in Farm 
Boy's Career Plans," Iowa Farm Science, Vol. 17, No. 4, Octo-
ber 1962, p. 8-284. 
An agronomist now on the staff at Iowa State Uni-
versity refers to personal interviews that he has had with 
numbers of farmers back in the hills in southeastern 
United States, who profess to be quite content with their 
incomes of less than $1,000 a year. They work when 
they want to, go squirrel-hunting when they feel like it, 
and do a little fishing when the spirit moves them. Many 
a harassed businessman-or professor-luxuriates in this 
kind of living on vacation and plans to do it all year 
round when he retires. But these farmers live almost as 
relaxedly as this all their lives. Who will say they are 
making a mistake?6 9 
If the number of these farmers were large enough, 
equilibrium would be reached with considerably lower 
money incomes on farms than in town. But part of this 
disparity would be made up by higher nonmoney in-
comes-much as professors at some Western mountain 
universities are reputed to take about $1,000 of their 
salary in mountain scenery and recreation-so that real 
incomes would be nearly equal. 
2. A small disparity would still remain, even then. 
For there has to be enough difference between farm in-
come and nonfarm incomes to induce the continuing ex-
cess of farmers to move off the farm and into urban 
jobs. The obstacles to this movement can be reduced, 
but it is too much to hope that they can be completely 
eliminated. Farm income will remain a little below non-
farm income for comparable-ability, enough for the dif.. 
ference to .overcome the obstacles that still remain after 
everything possible has been done to remove them. 
Water will flow only downhill, unless it is under pres-
sure; and in free-enterprise United States, governmental 
occupational pressure would be out of place. 
To this small extent, then, equality of farm and non-
farm income in the United States is likely to remain an 
objective that can be closely approached but not fully 
attained. 
6 9 The senior author has gone into this subject more 
fully in three papers: "What can a Research Man Say About 
Values?" Reprinted from journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 
XXXVIII , No. 1, February 1956, "What can a Research 
.. Man do in Agricultural Price Policy?" Reprinted from jour-
nal of Farm Economics, Vol. XXXVII, No.2 , May 1955, and 
"Discussion" from Goals and Values in Agricultural Policy, 
Iowa State University Center for Agricultural and Economic 
Adjustment, Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1961, 
pp. 164-170. 
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